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An Indigenous Lens into Comparative Law:  The Doctrine of Discovery 
in the United States and New Zealand 
Robert J. Miller* and Jacinta Ruru§      
 
The United States and New Zealand were colonized under an international legal 
principle that is known today as the Doctrine of Discovery.  When England set out to 
explore and exploit new lands, it justified its sovereign and property claims over newly 
found territories and the Indigenous inhabitants with the Discovery Doctrine.1  This legal 
principle was created and justified by religious, racial and ethnocentric ideas of European 
and Christian superiority over the other cultures, religions, and races of the world.2   
The Doctrine provided that newly-arrived Europeans automatically acquired 
property rights in native lands and gained sovereign, political, and commercial rights over 
the inhabitants without their knowledge or consent.3  When Europeans planted their flags 
and crosses in these “newly discovered” lands they were not just thanking God for a safe 
voyage; they were instead undertaking the well-recognized procedures and rituals of 
Discovery designed to demonstrate their legal claim over the lands and peoples.4   
  Surprisingly, perhaps, the Doctrine is still international law and is still applied in 
the United States and New Zealand today.  In fact, American, Canadian, New Zealand, 
and Australian courts have struggled with questions regarding Discovery and Native land 
titles just in recent decades.5  In addition, in August 2007, Russia evoked the Doctrine 
when it placed its flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean in an effort to claim the ten billion 
tons of oil and gas estimated to be there.6    
In the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries, England fully utilized Discovery in its 
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explorations and claims over Native peoples in North America and New Zealand.  The 
English colonists and then the American state and federal governments7 and New 
Zealand8 all utilized the Doctrine of Discovery and its religious, cultural, and racial ideas 
of superiority over American Indian and Maori peoples to stake legal claims to the lands 
and property rights of these Indigenous peoples.  The United States and New Zealand 
were ultimately able to enforce the Doctrine against the American Indian and Maori 
Nations.  Discovery is still the law and it is still being used against American Indians and 
Maoris and their governments today.9    
In this Article, we compare the similarities and differences between the use of the 
Doctrine of Discovery by English colonists in the United States and New Zealand and 
examine the state of the law of the Doctrine today in our two countries.  In section one, 
we briefly set out the definition and elements of Discovery.  Section two analyzes the 
legal development of Discovery in the English colonies in America, the thirteen 
American states, and the federal government of the United States.  Section three recounts 
the use of Discovery in New Zealand from the earliest days of English colonization.  
Section four highlights the similarities and differences in the use and definition of 
Discovery in the legal history of our two countries.  Section five concludes with the 
authors’ opinions that it is high past time for New Zealand and the United States to stop 
using the feudal, religious, and ethnocentric Doctrine against their Indigenous citizens. 
The value of this Article lies in its comparative methodology.  Little comparative 
work exists between the United States and South Pacific countries, such as New 
Zealand.10  This is certainly the first time that we have turned our legal academic gaze 
upon the other’s country.  As many comparativists wisely state, one needs to be familiar 
with the foreign legal system in order to do useful comparative research.11  By 
undertaking this collaborative research, we hope to dialogue comparatively and in doing 
so come to better understand each other’s legal system and also our own legal system.  
Moreover, while some work has been done in the United States and New Zealand to 
understand the Doctrine of Discovery,12 this Article seeks to instill the fresh 
                                                          
7 See infra section II.  
 
8 See infra section III. 
 
9 Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 104-17 (2006); 
Jacinta Ruru, What Could Have Been? The Common Law Doctrine of Native Title in Land under Salt 
Water in Australia & Aotearoa/New Zealand, 32 MONASH L. REV. 116 (2006). 
 
10 But see, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Native Fishing Rights and Environmental Protection in North America 
and New Zealand: A Comparative Analysis of Profits a Prendre and Habitat Servitudes, 8 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1 
(1989); Christian N Siewers Jr, Balancing a Colonial Past with a Multicultural Future: Maori Customary 
Title in the Foreshore and Seabed after Ngati Apa, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 253  (2004); Graeme 
W Austin, Re-Treating Intellectual Property?, The Wai 262 Proceeding and the Heuristics of Intellectual 
Property Law,  11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333 (2003); Stuart Banner, Conquest by Contract: Wealth 
Transfer and Land Market Structure in Colonial New Zealand, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47 (2000).         
  
11  Nils Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge,  in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE  LAW 307, 339 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).   
 
12 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2; Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 
42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 104-17 (2006); David V. Williams, The Foundation of Colonial Rule in New Zealand, 
 2
understandings and appreciations imbedded in a comparative approach.  The comparative 
approach allows us to illustrate with force the pervasiveness of an historic precedent that 
has had major ramifications for Indigenous peoples living in European colonized 
countries throughout the world, including the United States and New Zealand.  
Additionally, this Article contributes to the growing comparative law literature by 
injecting an Indigenous lens into its theoretical base.  Recent comparative law texts gloss 
over this dimension and in doing so contribute to a perception that comparative law 
remains fixed in a colonial binary of ethnocentricity.  In resisting this trend, comparative 
legal methodology provides us with a tool to advance the dire need to decolonize judicial 
systems and legislatures all over the world.  It is to this end that we come together to 
write this Article. 
 
I.  THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY   
 
In 1823, in Johnson v. M’Intosh,13 the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Doctrine of Discovery was an established legal principle of English and American 
colonial law and that it was also the law of the American state and federal governments.14  
The Court defined Discovery to mean that when European, Christian nations discovered 
lands unknown to Europeans they automatically gained sovereign and property rights in 
the lands even though, obviously, Indigenous people were already occupying and using 
them.15  The property right thus acquired was defined as being a future right, an odd form 
of fee simple ownership, an exclusive title held by the discovering European country that 
was subject only to the Natives’ use and occupancy rights.16  In addition, the discoverer 
also gained sovereign governmental rights over the Native peoples and their governments 
which restricted tribal international political, commercial, and diplomatic powers.17  This 
transfer of rights was accomplished without the knowledge or consent of Native people.   
 In Johnson, the Supreme Court defined the Doctrine and set out the exclusive 
property rights a discovering European country acquired.  “[D]iscovery gave title to the 
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made against all other 
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.”18  
Accordingly, the European discoverer gained real property rights in new lands merely by 
walking ashore and planting a flag in the soil.  Native rights, however, were “in no 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 NEW ZEALAND UNIVS. L. REV. 54 (1988). 
13 21 U.S. 543 (8 Wheat.) (1823). 
 
14 21 U.S. at 571.  The case involved land purchases made by British citizens in 1773 and 1775. 
 
15 21 U.S. at 573-74. 
 
16 21 U.S. at 573, 574, 584, 588, 592, 603; see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 139-44 
(1810); Meigs v. M‘Clung’s Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11, 17-18 (1815). 
 
17 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. 
 
18 21 U.S. at 573.  Accord id. at 574, 584, 588, 592 (“The absolute ultimate title has been considered as 
acquired by discovery”), 603. 
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instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.”19  
This was so because, although the Doctrine recognized that Natives still held the legal 
right to possess, occupy, and use their lands as long as they wished, their right to sell their 
lands to whomever they wished and for whatever price they could negotiate was limited. 
“[T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they 
pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive 
title to those who made it.”20  In essence, Indian Nations were preempted from selling 
their lands to anyone but the discovering European country.  The discovering country 
thus acquired the exclusive option to purchase tribal lands whenever tribes consented to 
sell.  Moreover, the discovering European country could even grant its future interest in 
the property to others.21   
 Obviously, Discovery diminished the economic value of Native lands and greatly 
benefited the European countries and colonists.22  Consequently, Indigenous real 
property rights and values were adversely affected immediately and automatically u
the “discovery” of their lands by Europeans.  Moreover, Native sovereign powers we
greatly affected by the Doctrine because their national sovereignty and independence 
were considered to have been limited by Discovery since it restricted Native Nations’ 




                                                          
23   
 The political and economic aspects of the Doctrine were developed to serve the 
interests of Europeans in an attempt to control their explorations and potential conflicts.  
While they occasionally disagreed over the exact definition of the Doctrine, and 
sometimes fought over discoveries, one thing they never disagreed on was that Native 
people lost significant property and governmental rights immediately upon their first 
discovery by a European country.   
 The Doctrine was developed in Europe over many centuries by the Church and 
England, Spain, Portugal and France.24  It was rationalized under the alleged authority of 




21 Id. at 573-74, 579, 592; see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 139-44 (1810). 
 
22 Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian 
Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1078, 1110-31 (2000); Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or 
Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations, 37 J. L. ECON. 39 (1994). 
 
23 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574 (“their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished”).  See also id. at 584-85, 587-88 (the English government and then the American government 
“asserted title to all the lands occupied by Indians [and] asserted also a limited sovereignty over them”); 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831) (an attempt by another country to “form a 
political connection with them [American Indian tribes] would be considered by all as an invasion of our 
territory, and an act of hostility.”). 
 
24 Miller, 42 IDAHO L. REV. supra note 12, at 8-21; PAGDEN, supra note 2, at 8, 24, 126; WILLIAMS, supra 
note 2, at 14; THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE: THE FIRST PHASE (James Muldoon ed. 1977); JAMES A. 
BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW AND THE CRUSADER (1969). 
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the Christian God and the ethnocentric idea that Europeans had the power and right to 
claim the lands and rights of Indigenous peoples around the world.25  There is an ample 
body of literature on this aspect of Discovery that we will not add to here.  But we do 
need to highlight briefly how England defined Discovery to enlighten our explication of 
how England and its colonists used the Doctrine in the United States and New Zealand. 
 
A.  England and Discovery 
 
England faced a serious problem regarding its desire to explore and colonize in 
the New World.  England was still a Catholic country in 1493 and Henry VII was very 
concerned about infringing Spain’s rights in the New World and being excommunicated 
if he violated Spain’s church-granted rights.  In 1493, Pope Alexander VI had granted 
Spain exclusive Discovery right in the New World in three papal bulls.26  English 
explorations would have to be conducted under this canon law and the emerging 
international law of Discovery.  Hence, the English legal scholars had to devise a way 
around the papal decrees.  They analyzed canon law, the bulls, and history, and 
developed new theories about Discovery that allowed England to explore and colonize in 
the New World notwithstanding Spanish rights.   
The primary theory developed by English scholars was that Henry VII would not 
violate the papal bulls, which had divided the world for the Spanish and Portuguese, if 
English explorers restrained themselves to only finding and claiming lands not yet 
discovered by any other Christian prince.27  This expanded definition of the elements of 
Discovery was further refined by the Protestant Queen Elizabeth I and her advisers to 
require current occupancy and actual possession by Europeans of non-Christian lands as 
crucial elements of creating a complete title in those lands for the discovering country.28  
Consequently, Henry VII and his successors, Elizabeth I and James I, repeatedly 
instructed their explorers to discover and colonize lands “unknown to all Christians” and 
“not actually possessed of any Christian prince.”29 
 England also developed another justification for Discovery claims over the lands 
of Indigenous peoples; the principle of terra nullius or vacant land.  Terra nullius stands 
for the idea that lands not possessed by any person or nation, or which are occupied and 
                                                          
25 PAGDEN, supra note 2, at 24, 126 (civilized countries had to be Christian); Steven T. Newcomb, The 
Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. 
McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 316 (1993) (“Christians simply 
refused to recognize the right of non-Christians to remain free of Christian dominion.”). 
 
26 MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, supra note 1, at 13-15; WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 74 & 81. 
 
27 MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, supra note 1, at 13-15; WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 74 & 81. 
 
28 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 121-50. 
 
29 I FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 18, 22-29 (W. Keith Kavenagh ed. 
1973) (reprinting Letters Patent Henry VII to John Cabot March 1496, the November 1620 Patent of New 
England by King James I); id. vol. III, at 1690-98 (reprinting Elizabeth I Letters Patent to Humphrey 
Gilbert June 1578 and Charter to Walter Raleigh March 1583 and First Charter of Virginia April 1606 
James I); SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1606 – 1775 
24-25 (William MacDonald ed. 1993) (Patent for New England).   
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possessed by non-Europeans but not being used in a fashion that European legal systems 
approved, were considered to be waste or vacant.30  Thus, England argued that land was 
available for its Discovery claims, first, if no other European country was in actual 
possession when English explorers arrived, and, second, even if it was occupied by 
Native people if it was legally “vacant” and “unused” or terra nullius.  England, the 
colonies, and the United States often used this argument against American Indians when 
they claimed, for example, that Indians were using land only for hunting and leaving it a 
wilderness. 
Clearly, England was a strong advocate of the Doctrine and eagerly adopted the 
international law principle as it was being developed by the Church and Spain and 
Portugal in the fifteenth century.  England then claimed for centuries that John Cabot’s 
1496-1498 explorations and his alleged first discoveries of the east coast of North 
America gave it priority over any other European country even including Spain’s claim 
of first discovery via Columbus.31  England also later contested Dutch settlements and 
trade in North America due to England’s “first discovery, occupation, and possession”32 
of its colonial settlements.  
As we will see in Section II below, the Doctrine was enshrined by England and its 
colonists into American law centuries before it was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1823 in Johnson v. M’Intosh.  But we will see that Johnson has become the definitive 
word on the subject in American law, and is the leading case that New Zealand, 
Canadian, and Australian courts have relied on to apply Discovery in their countries.33   
 
B. The elements of Discovery 
 
 In addition to the brief discussion above on the basic parameters of Discovery, we 
                                                          
 
30 COLIN G. CALLOWAY, CROWN AND CALUMET: BRITISH-INDIAN RELATIONS, 1783-1815 9 (1987); Alex C. 
Castles, An Australian Legal History 63 (1982), reprinted, in ABORIGINAL LEGAL ISSUES, COMMENTARY 
AND MATERIALS 10 (H. McRae et al eds. 1991) (Terra nullius is a doctrine that essentially ignored the title 
of original inhabitants based on subjective assessments of their level of “civilization.”).  Compare PAGDEN, 
supra note 2, at 91 (Spain and Portugal did not need terra nullius claims because they had claims based on 
papal grants; England and France did not have that benefit).  See also Johnson, 21 U.S. at 595; United 
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846) (“the whole continent was divided and parcelled out, and granted 
by the governments of Europe as if it had been vacant and unoccupied land”); Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 
41 U.S. 367, 409 (1842): 
 
“The English possessions in America were not claimed by right of conquest, but by right of 
discovery.  For, according to the principles of international law . . . the absolute rights of property 
and dominion were held to belong to the European nation by which any particular portion of the 
country was first discovered. . . . the territory occupied was disposed of by the governments of 
Europe, at their pleasure, as if it had been found without inhabitants.” 
 
31 PAGDEN, supra note 2, at 90 (citing an English author who claimed in 1609 James I’s rights in America 
were by “right of discovery”); WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 161, 170, 177-78. 
 
32 VII EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 30-32 (Alden T. Vaughan 
& Barbara Graymont eds. 1998) [hereinafter EAID]. 
 
33 See, e.g, note 5 supra. 
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see the Doctrine as being comprised of ten distinct elements:34 
 
1.  First discovery.  The first European country to discover new lands unknown to other 
Europeans gained property and sovereign rights over the lands and Indigenous people.  
First discovery alone, without a taking of physical possession, was often considered to 
create a claim of title to the land but it was usually considered to be an incomplete title.    
 
2.  Actual occupancy and current possession.  For a European country to turn a first 
discovery claim into a complete title, it had to actually occupy and possess the discovered 
lands.  This was usually done by building forts or settlements.  This physical possession 
had to be accomplished within a reasonable amount of time after first discovery.35   
 
3.  Preemption/European title.  The discovering European country gained the power of 
preemption, that is, the sole right to buy the land from the Indigenous people.  This is a 
valuable property right similar to an exclusive option in real estate.  The government that 
held the right of preemption thus prevented or preempted any other European or 
American government or individual from buying land from the Native owners.     
 
4.  Native title.  After first discovery, Indigenous peoples were considered by European 
and American legal systems to have lost the full property rights and ownership of their 
lands.  They only retained the rights to occupy and use their lands.  Nevertheless, these 
rights could last forever if they never consented to sell.  But if they did choose to sell, 
they could only sell to the government that held the power of preemption over their lands.  
Thus, “Indian title” in the United States, and “Maori title” in New Zealand was, and is 
today, a limited ownership right. 
 
5.  Tribal limited sovereign and commercial rights.  After first discovery, Indigenous 
Nations and peoples were also considered to have lost some of their inherent sovereign 
powers and the rights to free trade and diplomatic relations on the international stage.  
Thereafter, they could only deal with the government that had first discovered them. 
 
6.  Contiguity.  This element provided that Europeans had a claim to a significant amount 
of land contiguous to and surrounding their actual settlements.  Contiguity became very 
important when European countries had settlements close together.  In that situation, each 
country held rights to a point half way between their settlements.  Moreover, contiguity 
held that the discovery of the mouth of a river gave the discovering country a claim over 
all the lands drained by that river; even if that was thousands of miles.36 
                                                          
34 MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, supra note 1, at 3-5. 
 
35 New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 787-88 & n.8 (1998) (“Even as to terra nullius, like a volcanic 
island or territory abandoned by its former sovereign, a claimant by right as against all others has more to 
do than planting a flag or rearing a monument.  Since the 19th century the most generous settled view has 
been that discovery accompanied by symbolic acts gives no more than ‘an inchoate title, an option, as 
against other states, to consolidate the first steps by proceeding to effective occupation within a reasonable 
time.’” quoting I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (4th ed. 1990)).  
 
36 Compare the shapes of the Louisiana Territory and the Oregon Country for examples of this element. 
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7.  Terra nullius.  This phrase literally means land or earth that is void or empty.  This 
element held that if lands were not possessed or occupied by any person or nation, or 
even if they were occupied by non-Europeans but were not being used in a fashion that 
European legal and property systems approved, then the lands were considered to be 
empty and available for Discovery claims.  Euro-Americans often considered lands that 
were actually owned, occupied, and actively utilized by Indigenous people to be vacant.   
 
8.  Christianity.  Religion was a significant aspect of the Doctrine.  Non-Christians did 
not have the same rights to land, sovereignty, and self-determination as Christians. 
  
9.  Civilization.  The European definition of civilization and ideas of superiority were an 
important part of Discovery.  Euro-Americans and New Zealanders thought that God had 
directed them to bring civilized ways and education and religion to Indigenous peoples 
and to exercise paternalistic and guardianship powers over them. 
 
10.  Conquest.  This element provided for the acquisition of Native lands and title by 
military victories in just and necessary wars.  But conquest was also used as a “term of 
art” under Discovery to describe the property rights Europeans gained automatically over 
Indigenous Nations just by showing up and making a first discovery. 
 
England and its colonists applied all these elements, in the legal and practical sense, in 
their colonization of the United States and New Zealand.   
 
  II.  THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN UNITED STATES LAW  
 
The Doctrine of Discovery was the international law and legal authority that the 
English Crown used to explore and colonize America.  It is no surprise, then, that the 
principle was adopted by the American colonial governments.  The idea that Discovery 
passed title to Indian lands to the Crown, the right to preempt all sales of Indian lands, 
and sovereign rights over the Indian Nations was universally applied by colonial 
governments in their dealings with the tribes of North America and with their own 
colonists.37  After the American Revolutionary War, the new American states continued 
exercising Discovery to control all purchases of Indian lands and sovereign interactions 
with tribes.  Discovery was the accepted law used by the English colonies and the 
American states for their interactions with Indian Nations. 
 
A.  The Colonial law of Discovery  
 
 The English colonists in America and their governing entities assumed that the 
Crown held the Discovery power over tribes and that the colonies were authorized to 
                                                          
 
37 See, e.g., IV EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 112 (Alden T. 
Vaughan & W. Stitt Robinson eds. 1983) (reprinting a June 1699 Virginia Committee Report) [ hereinafter 
IV EAID]; V THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 368 (William B. Wilcox ed. 1959-93) (Franklin stated 
that “his Majesty’s title [in] America appears founded on the discovery thereof first made, and the 
possession thereof first taken, in 1497"). 
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conduct political affairs and property transactions with the Indian Nations under royal 
authority.38  All the colonies enacted numerous laws exercising the authority of the 
King’s Discovery power to purchase Indian lands, to protect their exclusive right of 
preemption and sovereign powers over tribes, and to grant, they alleged, fee simple title 
in Indian lands even while tribes still occupied and used their lands. 
 The English colonies spent an enormous amount of time on Indian affairs and 
enacted an amazing number of statutes concerning Indian and Discovery issues.  Each 
colony enacted numerous statutes exercising preemption rights over the sales of Indian 
lands, controlling the trade between Indians and colonists, and exercising the sovereign 
authority they assumed they possessed over the Indian Nations.  One of the clearest and 
earliest examples was the 1638 law enacted by Maryland to control trade with Indians in 
which the colony stated that its legal authority was based on the Crown’s “right of first 
discovery” in which the King had “became lord and possessor”39 of Maryland and had 
gained outright ownership of the real property in the colony.   
 By far the most prolific subject for colonial statutory enactments and Discovery 
were attempts to exercise the preemption power to control Indian land sales.  Several 
common themes ran through these statutes: colonies exercised their Discovery power by 
requiring individuals to get licenses or permission from the colonial legislative assembly 
and/or governor before buying, leasing, or occupying Indian lands; colonies declared all 
sales or leases of Indian lands without prior approval to be null and void; sometimes 
colonial governments retroactively ratified previously unapproved purchases; and most 
colonies imposed forfeitures and heavy fines on unapproved purchases.40  Consequently, 
                                                          
 
38 Thompson v. Johnston, 6 Binn. 68, 1813 WL 1243, at *2 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1813); Sacarusa & Longboard v. 
William King’s Heirs, 4 N.C. 336 1816 WL 222, at *2 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1816).  See also SHAW LIVERMORE, 
EARLY AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT 20, 31 (1939); III 
THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON 541-43 (Susan Myra Kingsbury ed. 1933) (1622 
letter stated that Virginia was the King’s property because it was “first discouered” at the charge of Henry 
VII by John Cabot who “tooke possession thereof to the Kings vse”); XV EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 47-48 (Alden T. Vaughan & Deborah A. Rosen eds. 1998) 
[hereinafter EAID] (reprinting a Virginia March 10, 1656 law); VIII EAID, supra note 32, at 576-77 
(reprinting a 1703 New Jersey Indian Land Purchase Act).   
 
39 II FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1267 (W. Keith Kavenagh ed., 
1973). 
 
40 See, e.g., I FOUNDATIONS, supra note 29, at 194, 413, 601 (reprinting June 1687 Connecticut “Act for the 
Regulating of the Purchase of Lands from Indians”; Laws of Massachusetts Relating to Indians from 1633-
48 and 1651 Rhode Island law); id. Vol. II, supra note 38, at 925-31, 1282 (New Jersey law 1700 and New 
York law Trade with Indians 1664/65); XV EAID, supra note 38, at 46-48, 153-54, 259 (reprinting 
Virginia laws of 1656 and 1763, Maryland law 1639, North Carolina law October 1748); XVI EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 20-21, 170-71, 295-96, 406 (Alden T. 
Vaughan & Deborah A. Rosen eds. 1998) (reprinting 1715 North Carolina law, South Carolina laws of 
1712 and 1739, Georgia law 1758); II COLONY LAWS OF VIRGINIA 1619-1660 467-68 (John D. Cushing ed. 
1978); THE EARLIEST ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS: 
1647-1719 139 (John D. Cushing ed. 1977) (1719 Rhode Island Act); ACTS AND LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 
1680-1726 142 (John D. Cushing ed. 1978) (1719 New Hampshire law); THE COLONY LAWS OF NORTH 
AMERICA SERIES 35-36 (1977) (New Haven & Connecticut Laws 1639-1673).  The colonies also utilized 
the Discovery element of vacant lands, terra nullius, to define lands that were available for colonial 
 9
every one of the English colonies in America enacted multiple laws that applied the 
Doctrine of Discovery and preemption to sales of Indian lands.41   
 The colonies also assumed they had been granted sovereign and superior positions 
over tribal governments and could control the trade with Indians.  The colonies enacted 
statutes requiring colonial licenses for Indian traders.42  And, as part of their sovereignty 
over tribes and individual Indians, some colonies assumed that American Indians had 
become subjects of the Crown and that tribes were the King’s tributaries.43  
 The Crown even attempted to enforce its Discovery power against its colonists 
and colonies; especially after the French and Indian War of 1756-1763.44  In an attempt 
to avoid future wars, King George III imposed his authority in America to control th
primary issues that led to such conflicts; Indian trade and land purchases.
e 
                                                                                                                                                                            
45  The King 
centralized the control of Indian affairs in his government and, most significantly, 
exercised his Discovery power of preemption to take control over the trade with Indians 
and all sales of tribal lands.46  He did this in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.   
 The Proclamation drew a boundary line along the crest of the Appalachia and 
Allegheny mountains over which British citizens were not to cross.  The King ordered 
that the tribes in this territory “live under our protection” and that it was essential to 
colonial security that the tribes not be “disturbed in the possession of such parts of our 
dominions and territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by us, are reserved to 
them . . . .”47  Thus, King George expressly claimed his Discovery title to tribal lands 
even though they had not yet been sold by the tribes to England.  The King then ordered 
 
disposal.  E.g., IV EAID, supra note 37, at 92-93, at 110-14 (reprinting 1688 Virginia law and 1699 
Virginia Committee report). 
 
41 James Madison wrote James Monroe in 1784 that the power of preemption over Indian lands “was the 
principal right formerly exerted by the Colonies with regard to the Indians [and] that it was a right asserted 
by the laws as well as the proceedings of all of them . . . .”  VIII THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 156 
(Robert A Rutland et al eds. 1983).  
 
42 IV EAID, supra note 37, at 51, 70-71 (reprinting 1626 and 1653 Virginia laws). 
 
43 See, e.g., XV EAID, supra note 38, at 40-41, 47-48, 153, 283, 306-07 (reprinting 1649, 1656 and 1723 
Virginia laws, 1669 and 1698 Maryland laws); XIX EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND 
LAWS, 1607-1789 30, 176-78, 406-12, 436, 525, 538-39 (Alden T. Vaughan & Daniel R. Mandell eds. 
2003) (reprinting a 1621 document from New England, a 1644 Rhode Island document, a 1644 
Massachusetts document, documents from the New Plymouth Colony in 1671, a 1675 document, a 1704 
Massachusetts law, a 1723 document allowing the Mohegans to meet and choose their chiefs); XVI EAID, 
supra note 40, at 46-48 (1748 North Carolina law); IV EAID, supra note 37, at 70-71 (reprinting 1653 
Virginia law). 
 
44 DOROTHY V. JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE: COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY AMERICA 36 (1982); 
JACK M. SOSIN, WHITEHALL AND THE WILDERNESS: THE MIDDLE WEST IN BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 
1760-1775 79-83 (1961).    
 
45 SOSIN, supra note 44, at 28-31, 45-46, 48-49, 51, 56; FRED ANDERSON, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN 
YEARS' WAR AND THE FATE OF EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766  85, 221, 565-57 (2000). 
 
46 ANDERSON, supra note 45, at 85, 221, 565-57.  
 
47 I HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 47-48 (8th ed. 1968). 
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that none of his officials could allow surveys or grant titles in this area, and that none of 
his subjects could purchase or settle on Indian lands without royal permission.48  Further 
defining his Discovery power, the King said that these Indian lands were “reserve[d] 
under our sovereignty, protection, and dominion, for the use of the said Indians . . . .”49  
The King also took control of trade with Indians by requiring all traders to provide bonds 
and to be licensed by his officials.50  The Proclamation clearly shows the Crown’s 
exercise of Discovery powers in North America.  
  
B.  The State law of Discovery    
 
 The new state governments that developed after the colonies declared 
independence immediately began applying Discovery.  They asserted in their 
constitutions and earliest statutes the same powers of sovereignty and preemption over 
the Indian Nations and tribal lands as they had done during colonial times. 
In Virginia’s 1776 constitution, for example, the people and the state claimed the 
power of Discovery and preemption over Indian lands when they alleged that “no 
purchase of lands shall be made of the Indian natives but on behalf of the public, by 
authority of the General Assembly.”51  In 1777, New York’s constitution also claimed the 
preemption power: “no purchases or contracts for the sale of lands, made since . . . one 
thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, or which may hereafter be made with or of the 
said Indians . . . shall be binding on the said Indians, or deemed valid, unless made under 
the authority and with the consent of the legislature of this State.”52  Moreover, North 
Carolina in 1776,  Tennessee in 1796, and Georgia in 1798, all enshrined Discovery 
principles in their constitutions.53      
 Furthermore, the laws that the new states enacted regarding Indian affairs also 
demonstrated the elements of Discovery.  In May 1779, Virginia declared that land 
purchases from Indian Tribes were void if they had been conducted without the 
permission of the colonial or state government.54  The law expressly reaffirmed that 
Virginia possessed the “exclusive right of preemption”55 to extinguish Indian title within 
its borders.  Connecticut also took control of sales of Indian lands within its borders in 
                                                          
 
48 Id. at 49. 
 




51 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 35, ch. II, sec. XXI (John D. Cushing ed. 1982). 
52 N.Y. CONST. art. 37 (1777).  The state took steps to enforce its constitutional provision in 1788 by 
imposing criminal sanctions on violations of the constitutional provision.  N.Y. Act of March 18, 1788, 
Sess. 11, ch. 85; 2 Greenl. ed. Laws 194.   
 
53 N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25 (1776); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 32 (1796); GA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1798). 
 
54 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 104, ch. XXV, § II (John D. Cushing ed. 1982).  See also 
Marshall v. Clark, 8 Va. 268, 1791 WL 325, at *3 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1791). 
 
55 FIRST LAWS, supra note 54, at 103, ch. XXV, § I. 
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1776.56  In 1783, 1789, and 1802, North Carolina declared purchases of Indian lands to 
be void unless they had been approved by the colonial or state governments, and it took 
steps to control other activities on tribal lands.57  In 1780, 1783, 1784, and 1787, Georgia 
passed laws that declared null and void any attempts by private parties to purchase Indian 
lands.58  In 1798, Rhode Island took total control of Indian affairs, including purchases of 
Indian lands.59   
State courts occasionally got involved in applying Discovery principles.  In 1835, 
for example, in Tennessee v. Forman,60 the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the 
authority of the legislature to extend state criminal jurisdiction into Indian country.  The 
court relied on the elements of Discovery and the “law of Christendom”61 to hold that the 
state possessed sovereign powers over Indian tribes and could impose its laws in tribal 
territory.  A concurring opinion also harkened back to the Spanish idea of Discovery and 
“just war” to justify taking the lands of Native people because Americans could fight to 
“defend” themselves if Indian Nations resisted Americans taking tribal lands.62   
 Many other state courts demonstrated their agreement with Discovery and upheld 
state assertions of sovereignty and jurisdiction over tribes, the imposition of state laws in 
Indian territory, and the royal, colonial, and state fee simple ownership of tribal lands.63  
In Arnold v. Mundy,64 the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that “when Charles II. took 
possession of the country, by his right of discovery, he took possession of it in his 
sovereign capacity . . . .”65  The court also stated that the people of New Jersey had “both 
                                                          
 
56 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 101-02 (John D. Cushing ed. 1982). 
 
57 Danforth v. Wear, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 673, 677-78 (1824); 2 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH 
CAROLINA 446 (John D. Cushing ed. 1984); see also Sacarusa & Longboard v. William King’s Heirs, 4 
N.C. 336, 1816 WL 222 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1816) (referring to an 1802 law). 
 
58 Patterson v. The Rev. Willis Jenks et al., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 216, 234 (1829); I THE FIRST LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF GEORGIA 288 (John D. Cushing ed. 1981). 
 
59 I THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 10 (John D. Cushing ed. 1983). 
 
60 16 Tenn. 256 (1835). 
 
61 Id. at 258-85, 287, 332-35; see also at 277 (“the principle declared in the fifteenth century as the law of 
Christendom, that discovery gave title to assume sovereignty over, and to govern the unconverted natives 
of Africa, Asia, and North and South America, has been recognized as a part of the national law, for nearly 
four centuries”). 
 
62 Id. at 339-45 (based on Discovery, if tribes opposed Anglo-American rights to occupy tribal lands they 
could “use force to repel such resistance.”).  See also MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, supra note 1, at 16-17 
(Spanish views on “just war”). 
 
63 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Alabama, 2 Stew. & P. 327, 396, 408, 413-16 (Ala. 1831); Georgia v. Tassels, 1 
Dud. 229, 231-32, 234, 237-38 (Ga. 1830); Jackson, ex dem. Smith v. Goodell, 20 Johns. 188 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1822); Jackson v. Sharp, 14 Johns. 472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817); Sacarusa & Longboard v. William King’s 
Heirs, 4 N.C. 336 1816 WL 222, at *3 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1816); Strother v. Martin, 5 N.C. 162, 1807 WL 35, 
at *2-3 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1807).   
 
64 6 N.J.L. 1, 1821 WL 1269 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1821). 
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the legal title and the usufruct . . . exercised by them in their sovereign capacity . . . .”66  
Thus, according to this court, the King and New Jersey owned Indian lands as part of 
their sovereign authority.  The court also relied on the Discovery elements of first 
discovery and terra nullius because it claimed New Jersey was “an uninhabited country 
found out by British subjects.”67   
 Other state courts used Discovery to define the tribal real property right to be just 
a possessory right.68  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with this idea and relied 
on the well known concept of preemption.69  One justice stated further that Indians could 
not own real property since “not being Christians, but mere heathens [they were] 
unworthy of the earth” and that the “right of discovery” had given the colony an interest 
that was “exclusive to a certain extent [and brought] . . . the Indian to his own market, 
where, if he sells at all, the Indian must take what he could get from this his only 
customer.”70  This statement demonstrated the impact of Discovery and preemption on 
the prices tribes received for their lands when there was only one possible buyer.  This 
justice also demonstrated the religious and cultural bias that lurks behind the Doctrine.  
 The American state governments clearly understood and applied the Doctrine of 
Discovery to exercise sovereign and real property rights over Indian Nations and people. 
 
C.  United States law and Discovery to 1823 
 
 The newly created United States government quickly adopted the elements of 
Discovery.  This is not surprising in light of the widespread acceptance of the Doctrine by 
the colonial and state governments.  In fact, long before the U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
in 1823 in that Discovery was the law of the United States, all the branches of the federal 
government had already been operating under Discovery.   
 In September 1774, the English colonies in America created their first federal 
entity, the Continental Congress.  This Congress dealt with the Indian Nations on a 
diplomatic and political basis, controlled the trade with tribes, and spent significant time 
and money trying to gain the support of the tribes in the Revolutionary War.71  This 
Congress soon realized it needed a more formal structure and it drafted the Articles of 
Confederation in 1777, which were specifically designed to give more authority, taxation 
                                                                                                                                                                             




67 Id. at *56. 
 
68 Strother v. Martin, 5 N.C. 162, 1807 WL 35, at *4 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1807). 
 
69 Thompson v. Johnston, 6 Binn. 68, 1813 WL 1243 a*2 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1813).    
 
70 Id. at *2 & 5 (“the king’s right was . . . founded . . . on the right of discovery”).          
 
71 See, e.g., XVIII EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 4, 39, 43, 59, 
63, 65, 70, 84, 98, 124, 203 (Alden T. Vaughan & Colin G. Calloway eds. 1994); Robert J. Miller, 
American Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and its Framers, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133, 
137 (1993); IV COLONIAL SERIES: THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 192-94 (W.W. Abbot ed. 1988). 
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power, and the sole voice in Indian affairs to the central federal government.72  The 
Articles attempted to place the sole power over Indian affairs and the Discovery power in 
the federal government.  Section IX provided that the Congress “shall also have the sole 
and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with 
the Indians . . . .”73  This language repeated the same claims of sovereign control over 
Indian affairs that had been previously made by the Crown, the colonies, and the states. 
The new Articles Congress then undertook steps to incorporate the Doctrine of 
Discovery into federal law and to take the preemption power under its control.  In 1783, 
after signing the treaty in which England ceded all its property, sovereignty, and 
Discovery claims south of Canada and east of the Mississippi River to the United States, 
Congress adopted the very Discovery precedent of George III’s Royal Proclamation of 
1763.  On September 22, 1783 Congress issued a resolution stating that no one could 
settle on or purchase Indian lands “without the express authority and directions of the 
United States in Congress assembled” and “that every such purchase or settlement, gift or 
cession, not having the authority aforesaid, is null and void.”74  This was nothing less 
than an emphatic statement by the Articles Congress that it possessed the exclusive 
Discovery and preemption power over Indian lands and peoples.  Thereafter, Congress 
tried to enforce its preemption and sovereign powers to control the trade and all 
interactions with tribes against its citizens, its states, and Indian Nations.75  
 The Articles Congress also tried to settle the issue with the states of which 
government possessed the Discovery and preemption power over the western lands that 
England had ostensibly ceded to the United States in 1783.  The treaty with England 
clearly passed all of England’s property rights to the United States, but at least seven 
states still claimed land ownership rights under their charters to the Mississippi River, 
and even to the Pacific Ocean.76  The states ultimately, however, came to realize that it 
was in their best interests to allow Congress to be in charge of the western lands.77     
 The Articles Congress demonstrated most significantly its correct understanding 
of Discovery in its Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  This Act was designed to organize the 
settlement of the old Northwest Territory.  It expressly adopted the elements of Discovery 
to settle this region: “The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the 
                                                          
72 II OSCAR HANDLIN & LILLIAN HANDLIN, LIBERTY IN EXPANSION 1760-1850 146-48 (1989). 
73 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1781) (reprinted in AMERICAN HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 90 
(Harold C. Syrett ed. 1960)). 
 
74 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 3 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS]; see also CALLOWAY, supra note 30, at 9; XVIII EAID, supra note 71, at 278. 
 
75 PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 4 (reprinting an October 1783 congressional resolution); III THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 2140-42 (Wilcomb E. Washburn 
ed. 1973) (Ordinance for the Regulation and Management of Indian Affairs, Aug. 7, 1786). 
 
76 AMERICAN HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 94 (Harold C. Syrett ed. 1960); CATHERINE BOWEN, MIRACLE AT 
PHILADELPHIA 168-70 (1966). 
 
77 Fletcher v. Peck,  10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 142 (1810) (“The question whether the vacant lands within the 
United States became a joint property or belonged to the separate states, was a momentous question which, 
at one time, threatened to shake the American confederacy”); JONES, supra note 44, at 170; VINE DELORIA, 
JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 81 (1999). 
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Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; 
and in their property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless 
in just and lawful wars . . . .”78  This statute expressly required the Discovery element of 
consent for any sales of Indian title to real property, impliedly exercised the federal 
government’s exclusive preemption power, and also raised the specter of “just war,” 
which was an aspect of Spain’s interpretation of Discovery.79 
Throughout this time, the Articles Congress also dealt with the Indian Nations in a 
diplomatic and political relationship through treaty making.  These treaties demonstrate 
vividly the exercise of Discovery and preemption by Congress.  The common elements of 
Discovery are well represented in the eight treaties that the Articles Congress enacted 
with various Indian Nations.80  In addition, Congress exercised its preemption power to 
buy land from Indian Nations in these treaties and to establish borders for lands that the 
U.S. would recognize as tribally owned.81  And, the U.S. exercised the sovereign aspect 
of its Discovery authority over the Indian Nations and took “the sole and exclusive right 
of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner as 
[the United States] think proper.”82  Finally, the United States promised to take Indian 
Nations under its protection and the tribes acknowledged themselves “to be under the 
protection of the United States and of no other sovereign whatsoever.”83  This language 
and the ideas behind them mirrored the colonial understanding and exercise of Discovery. 
 The Articles Congress came to realize its inherent weakness, primarily in Indian 
affairs.84  A call now arose for the creation of a stronger federal government and this led 
                                                          
 
78 PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 9. 
 
79 Id.; PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE xiii (1992).  
See MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, supra note 1, at 16-17 (explaining Spanish views on “just war”). 
 
80 See, e.g., Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., Jan. 9, 1789, Art III, 7 Stat. 28; Treaty with the Six Nations, 
Oct. 22, 1784, Art. III & IV, 7 Stat. 15 (promising the Oneida Nation it would be secure “in the possession 
of [its] lands”); II INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 5-25 (Charles J. Kappler ed. 1904) [hereinafter II 
Kappler’s] (reprinting eight U.S./tribal treaties between 1785-89).  
 
81 See, e.g., Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, Art. III & IV, 7 Stat. 15; Treaty with the Wyandot, 
Etc., Jan. 9, 1789, Art I & XIII, 7 Stat. 28; Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 9, 1789, Art. 1 & 2, 7 Stat. 33; 
see also Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., Jan. 21, 1785, Art. VI, 7 Stat. 16; Treaty with the Shawnee, Jan. 31, 
1786, Art. II; II Kappler’s, supra note 80, at 7, 17-19, 21, 24. 
 
82 See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, Art. IX, 7 Stat. 18; Treaty with the Choctaw, Jan. 3, 
1786, Art. VIII, 7 Stat. 21; Treaty with the Chickasaw, Jan. 10, 1786, Art. VIII, 7 Stat. 24; see also Treaty 
with the Wyandot, Etc., Jan. 9, 1789, Art VII, 7 Stat. 28 (traders need licenses from the Territorial 
Governor); II Kappler’s, supra note 80, at  10, 13, 15-16, 20. 
 
83 See, e.g., Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15; Treaty with the Wyandot, Etc., Jan. 21, 
1785, Art. II, 7 Stat. 16; Treaty with the Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, Art. III, 7 Stat. 18; Treaty with the 
Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, Art. II, 7 Stat. 21; Treaty with the Chickasaw, Jan. 10, 1786, Art. II, 7 Stat. 24; 
Treaty with the Shawnee, Jan. 31, 1786, Art. V; II Kappler’s, supra note 80, at  5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 17. 
 
84 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 42 268-69 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (Madison called 
for full federal power over Indian affairs and deleting the ambiguous caveats in the Articles that allowed for 
state involvement); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 n.4 (1985) (“Madison 
cited the National Government’s inability to control trade with the Indians as one of the key deficiencies of 
 15
to the 1787 constitutional convention and the creation of a stronger national government 
that wasted no time in appropriating to itself the Discovery and preemption powers. 
 The drafters of the United States Constitution solved the problem of states 
meddling in Indian affairs and Discovery issues by placing the sole power to deal with 
Indian Tribes in the hands of Congress.  In Article I, the Constitution states that only 
Congress has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”85  The United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted this language to mean that Congress was granted the exclusive power to 
regulate trade and intercourse with Indian Tribes.86   
 The authority to be the only entity to control commercial affairs with the Indian 
Nations, including the sole power of buying Indian lands and trading with tribes, 
demonstrates the Doctrine of Discovery.  The President and the Senate were also granted 
the sole authority to control treaty making which granted those entities the power to 
continue making treaties with tribes as the United States had already been doing since 
1778.87  Thus, the new U.S. Constitution incorporated the Discovery power into the 
federal system and placed that power solely in the hands of the national government.  
 The very first Congress to operate under the Constitution immediately exercised 
the Discovery power it had been granted.  On July 22, 1790, Congress enacted a statute 
that is a perfect example of preemption; in fact, it even used that exact word:  
 
no sale of lands made by an Indian, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the 
United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether 
having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be 
made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the 
United States.88 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Articles of Confederation, and urged adoption of the Indian Commerce Clause”); Miller, supra note 71, 
18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. at 151-52. 
 
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  This constitutional provision placed the power to control Indian affairs “entirely 
with Congress, without regard to any state right on the subject . . . .”  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
(5 Pet.) 1, 63-64 (1831) (Thompson, J., dissenting).  The Constitution freed the federal government from 
the “shackles” imposed on its power in Indian affairs by the Articles of Confederation.  Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
 
86 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 
551-52 (1974). 
 
87 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  The Constitution also ratified all the treaties the Continental and Confederation 
Congresses had entered with tribes from 1778-1789.  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 
88 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 137, 138, § 4 (emphasis added), PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS, supra note 
74, at 15.  In 1792, the House proposed keeping the word preemption in the 1793 Trade and Intercourse 
Act designed to replace the temporary 1790 act.  XIV THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 441 (Robert A 
Rutland et al eds., 1983).  The draft 1793 Act continued to deny purchases of Indian lands by states even if 
they possessed the power of preemption.  Annals of Congress, 2d Cong., 2d Sess., 684, 731, 827; Gazette of 
the United States, 16 Jan. 1793.  The word preemption was deleted from the final act.  Act of March 1, 
1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329.  The permanent 1802 Trade and Intercourse Act, § 12, March 30, 1802 stated: “no 
purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian, or 
nation, or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the United States, shall be of any validity, in law or equity, 
unless the same be made by treaty or convention, entered into pursuant to the constitution . . . .”  PRUCHA, 
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This 1790 Act has been amended slightly and reenacted several times but it is still federal 
law today.89   
 The 1790 Act and its later versions also required persons desiring to trade with 
Indians and tribes to secure a federal license, to provide a bond, and to not trade alcohol 
in Indian country.90  Consequently, the central government was now firmly in charge of 
Indian affairs, the sovereign Discovery power, and preemption, just as King George III 
had tried to do with the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and just as the Articles of 
Confederation Congress had tried to do with its resolution of 1783 and other laws.  
 The new Executive Branch was well acquainted with the Discovery powers the 
federal government possessed and it did not hesitate to exercise them.  President 
Washington and his cabinet readily utilized Discovery in developing Indian policies and 
in using treaties to buy Indian lands whenever possible and to limit other nations, 
American states, and individuals from dealing with Indian Tribes.91  
The Executive Branch was very busy in its early years in negotiating, and the 
Senate ratifying, at least one hundred treaties with the Indian Nations between 1789 and 
1823.92  These treaties demonstrate precisely the contours of Discovery and preemption, 
and the federal government’s exercise of those powers.  The most obvious examples are 
exemplified in five treaties in 1808, 1804, 1795, 1794, and 1791 which limited the 
sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation and enforced against the Wyandotte, Osage, and 
Seneca Nations the United States’ preemption power to be the only purchaser of tribal 
lands.93  In addition, the United States repeatedly exercised preemption to buy land from 
tribes but always, allegedly, with their consent.94   
                                                                                                                                                                             
DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 19, § 12. 
 
89 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).  The 1790 Act was amended and reenacted in 1793, 1796, 1799, and made 
permanent in 1802.  Act of March 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; 
Act of March 3, 1799, 1 Stat. 743; Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139. 
 
90 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 137, 138, § 1; Act of March 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 1, 1 Stat. 329; Act of 
May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 7, 1 Stat. 469; Act of March 3, 1799, § 7, 1 Stat. 743; Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 
13, 2 Stat. 139. 
 
91 For an extensive discussion of Thomas Jefferson, Washington’s Secretary of State, and his views on 
Discovery, see MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, supra note 1, at 59-98.  For Washington’s Secretary of War 
Henry Knox, see PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 12; I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, INDIAN AFFAIRS 
12-14 (Secretary Knox’ 1789 report to Congress); ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, JEFFERSON AND THE INDIANS: 
THE TRAGIC FATE OF THE FIRST AMERICANS 166-67 (1999) (Knox stated that the U.S. should consider 
tribes as owning their lands, that could only be purchased with express federal approval).  For 
Washington’s Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, see XIV THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 89-91 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds. 1969) (Hamilton wrote that federal treaty 
commissioners should “do nothing which should in the least impair the right of pre-emption or general 
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  The treaties from 1789-1823 also demonstrate other aspects of the United States’ 
Discovery power.  For example, the United States further exercised its limited 
sovereignty over Indian Nations by controlling all trade and commerce with them.  The 
United States included a provision in almost every one of these treaties in which the tribe 
agreed that “the United States shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating their 
trade” and in which the United States promised to protect tribes, and in which the tribes 
acknowledged themselves “to be under the protection of the United States of America, 
and of no other sovereign whosoever . . . .”95   
 Moreover, for decades preceding Johnson in 1823, the Executive Branch 
explicitly used the Doctrine of Discovery to argue its territorial claim against England, 
Spain, and Russia to own the Pacific Northwest.96  The United States and England never 
really settled the legal question of who had the superior Discovery claim to the Oregon 
Country.  They argued about their rights under the elements of Discovery for four 
decades, signed two treaties to jointly occupy the Oregon Country, and finally, in 1846, 
drew the dividing line between the U.S. and Canada in the Northwest where it is today.97 
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 The facts demonstrate that the United States Constitution, the Congress, and the 
Executive Branch utilized the Doctrine of Discovery.  These federal entities understood 
the property and sovereign rights that Discovery granted the United States over the Indian 
Nations and their lands.  The federal government continues to exercise this power over 
the American Indian Nations to this day.98  
 It is worthwhile to note the following quotation from Johnson v. M’Intosh 
because it demonstrates most of the elements of Discovery. 
 
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule 
[Discovery] by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country.  They hold, 
and assert in themselves, the title by which it was acquired.  They maintain, as all 
others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the 
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right 
to such a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow 
them to exercise.99 
 
D.  Discovery and Manifest Destiny 
 
 We will now highlight a few points to demonstrate the use of the Doctrine of 
Discovery as America expanded across the continent.  Thomas Jefferson, in particular, 
exemplified a working day-to-day knowledge of Discovery and used its principles against 
the Indian Nations within the thirteen states, in the trans-Appalachia area, the Louisiana 
Territory, and the Pacific Northwest.  In fact, Jefferson's dispatch of Lewis and Clark in 
1803 was directly targeted at the mouth of the Columbia River in the Oregon Country to 
strengthen the United States’ Discovery claim to that area.  Lewis and Clark and their 
“Corps of Northwestern Discovery”100 complied with Jefferson's instructions and helped 
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to solidify the U.S. claim.  The United States then argued with Russia, Spain, and 
England for four decades that it owned the Northwest under international law because of 
its first discovery of the Columbia River through Robert Gray in 1792, the first inland 
exploration and occupation of the area by Lewis and Clark in 1805-06, and then John 
Jacob Astor’s construction of the first permanent settlement in 1811.101      
 After the Lewis and Clark expedition, American history is dominated by an 
erratic but fairly constant advance of American interests across the continent under the 
principles of the Doctrine of Discovery.  This was not an accident but was instead the 
expressed goal of Presidents Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Polk, and 
a host of other American politicians and citizens.  “Manifest Destiny” is the name that 
was ultimately used to describe this predestined and divinely inspired advance.   
 Historians identify three basic aspects of American Manifest Destiny.  We argue 
that these aspects arose directly from the elements of the Doctrine of Discovery.  First, 
Manifest Destiny assumes that the United States has unique moral virtues.  Second, 
Manifest Destiny asserts that the United States has a mission to redeem the world by 
spreading republican government and the American way of life around the globe.  Third, 
Manifest Destiny has a messianic dimension, because it assumes America has a divinely 
ordained destiny to accomplish these tasks.102  This kind of thinking could only arise 
from an ethnocentric view that one's own government, culture, race, religion, and country 
are superior to all others.  This same kind of thinking justified and motivated the 
development of the Doctrine of Discovery in the fifteenth century and then created 
Manifest Destiny in the nineteenth century. 
 The phrase Manifest Destiny was apparently not used to define American 
expansionism until 1845.  But the idea that it was the destiny of the United States to 
control and dominate North America was obvious long before 1845.  Instead of being a 
new idea, Manifest Destiny grew out of the elements of the Doctrine of Discovery, 
Thomas Jefferson’s ambitions, and the Lewis and Clark expedition.   
When Lewis and Clark returned to St. Louis in 1806, however, America’s destiny 
to expand to the Pacific Ocean was not so clear.103  Yet to Meriwether Lewis, who had 
just made that arduous voyage, the idea of the U.S. owning the Pacific Northwest was not 
farfetched.  Instead, he wrote President Jefferson in September 1806 that the United 
States should develop the continental fur trade from the mouth of the Columbia River.  
Lewis wrote that the United States “shall shortly derive the benefits of a most lucrative 
trade from this source, and that in the course of ten or twelve years a tour across the 
Continent by the rout mentioned will be undertaken by individuals with as little concern 
as a voyage across the Atlantic is at present.”104    
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 Lewis was not telling Jefferson anything new.  It seems clear that Jefferson 
expressly directed the Lewis and Clark expedition to the mouth of the Columbia River 
precisely to strengthen the U.S. claim to the Oregon Country based on the 1792 first 
discovery of the river by the American Robert Gray.  In fact, Senator Thomas Hart 
Benton, the main spokesmen for over thirty years that the United States should settle 
Oregon, stated that he got his ideas from Jefferson himself.105  
 The advocates of Manifest Destiny then used the Doctrine of Discovery and its 
elements to prove that it was America’s destiny to reach the Pacific.  For example, when 
the New York journalist John L. O’Sullivan first used the phrase Manifest Destiny in July 
1845, he used the term to argue that America should annex Texas.106  In his second use of 
the phrase, on December 27, 1845, O’Sullivan wrote a very influential editorial about the 
Oregon Country entitled “The True Title.”107  Interestingly, O’Sullivan expressly utilized 
the Doctrine of Discovery in arguing that the United States already held title to Oregon.  
He then relied on Manifest Destiny and Divine Providence as secondary arguments.   
 
Our legal title to Oregon, so far as law exists for such rights, is perfect.  Mr. 
Calhoun and Mr. Buchanan [U.S. Secretaries of State] have settled that question, 
once and for all.  Flaw or break in the triple chain of that title, there is none.  Not 
a foot of ground is left for England to stand upon, . . . . [U]nanswerable as is the 
demonstration of our legal title to Oregon . . . we have a still better title than any 
that can ever be constructed out of all these antiquated materials of old black-
letter international law.  Away, away with all these cobweb tissues of right of 
discovery, exploration, settlement, continuity, &c. . . . were the respective cases 
and arguments of the two parties, as to all these points of history and law, 
reversed—had England all ours, and we nothing but hers—our claim to Oregon 
would still be best and strongest.  And that claim is by the right of our manifest 
destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence 
has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated 
self-government entrusted to us. . . . [In England’s hands, Oregon] must always 
remain wholly useless and worthless for any purpose of human civilization or 
society. . . . The God of nature and of nations has marked it for our own; and with 
His blessing we will firmly maintain the incontestable rights He has given, and 
fearlessly perform the high duties He has imposed.108  
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“Black-letter international law,” “civilization,” the “right of discovery, exploration, 
settlement, continuity”—can there be any question that O’Sullivan used the elements of 
the Doctrine of Discovery to justify America’s legal title to Oregon?   
 One event deserves special emphasis.  In 1817, Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams and President Monroe decided to reoccupy Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia 
River to reassert America’s claim to the Oregon Country.  This was necessary because 
England had captured the post in the War of 1812.  The mission was designed, they 
wrote, “to assert the [American] claim of territorial possession at the mouth of [the] 
Columbia river.”109  Adams wrote that the mission was “to resume possession of that post 
[Astoria], and in some appropriate manner to reassert the title of the United States.”110  
The President and Secretary of State were discussing nothing less than using the rituals of 
Discovery to reassert the U.S. claim to Oregon. 
Monroe and Adams then dispatched John Prevost and Captain William Biddle in 
September 1817 to take symbolic possession of Astoria.  It should be no surprise that the 
actions they took to protect America’s Discovery claim on the Pacific coast were 
accomplished by Discovery rituals.  In fact, they were just carrying out the orders 
Monroe and Adams gave them to “assert there the claim of sovereignty in the name of . . 
. the United States, by some symbolical or other appropriate mode of setting up a claim 
of national authority and dominion.”111  
In August 1818, on the north side of the mouth of the Columbia River Biddle 
raised the U.S. flag, turned some soil with a shovel, just like the delivery of seisin ritual 
from feudal times, and nailed up a lead plate which read: “Taken possession of, in the 
name and on the behalf of the United States by Captain James Biddle, commanding the 
United States ship Ontario, Columbia River, August, 1818.”112  He then moved upriver 
and repeated these rituals on the south side.  Thereafter, John Prevost arrived at Astoria in 
October and staged a joint Discovery ritual.  The English flag at Fort Astoria was lowered 
and the U.S. flag raised in its place.  The English troops fired a salute and papers of 
transfer were signed by the English Captain, the Northwest Company agent, and 
Prevost.113  The American Discovery claim to the Pacific Northwest was again in place.   
Jumping ahead several decades, we see Discovery and its elements used in the 
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1840s to justify American expansion into Oregon.  The Democratic Party brought the 
issues to a head and included in its platform for the 1844 presidential election a 
Discovery demand to occupy Oregon.  The platform stated that “our title to the whole of 
the Territory of Oregon is clear and unquestionable; that no portion of the same ought to 
be ceded to England or any other power; and that the re-occupation of Oregon and the 
reannexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period are great American measures.”114  
The Democrat, James K. Polk, campaigned vigorously on these issues and.  His 
election slogan was about the Oregon Country - “54-40 or fight.”  Thus, Polk was 
claiming as American territory the entire drainage system of the Columbia River, into 
much of present day British Columbia.  The 1844 election was considered to be about 
American expansion and Polk’s victory was seen as a mandate for expansion.   
In his inaugural address on March 4, 1845, Polk addressed the Oregon question 
and Discovery.  While discussing “our territory which lies beyond the Rocky 
Mountains,” he stated that the United States “title to the country of the Oregon is ‘clear 
and unquestionable,’ and already are our people preparing to perfect that title by 
occupying it . . . .”115  The opening of the Northwest and the “extinguish[ing]” of the 
“title of numerous Indian tribes to vast tracts of country”116 for American settlement was 
a good thing, according to Polk. 
Furthermore, in October 1845, President Polk and Senator Benton of Missouri 
engaged in an amazing discussion about the U.S. claim to Oregon.  They agreed that 
international law, first discovery, contiguity, discovery rituals, and occupation proved 
that the U.S. owned Oregon.117  They were clearly applying Discovery and Manifest 
Destiny to the Oregon Country.  Thereafter, in December 1845, Polk delivered his First 
Annual Message to Congress and discussed the Oregon question at great length.  He 
stated that “our title to the whole Oregon Territory . . . [is] maintained by irrefragable 
[irrefutable] facts and arguments” and he asked Congress to decide how to maintain “our 
just title to that Territory.”118  He was equally confident that the evidence of Discovery 
proved that “the title of the United States is the best now in existence.”119  He also 
claimed that under international law England did not have a valid claim to the Pacific 
Northwest because “the British pretensions of title could not be maintained to any portion 
of the Oregon Territory upon any principle of public law recognized by nations.”120  
Ultimately, in 1846, the United States guaranteed its expansion to the Pacific 
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coast by signing a treaty with England and, in the 1850s, when it concluded treaties with 
tribal governments and exercised its preemption right to buy the Indian title to most of 
the land in the Oregon and Washington territories.121  
 
   III.  THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN NEW ZEALAND LAW  
 
 On the British stage of colonization, New Zealand often heralds itself as different 
and thus better than other colonies in developing relationships with its Indigenous 
peoples (in particular, superior to its neighbor Australia).  This is largely asserted in 
reference to high intermarriage statistics and the Treaty of Waitangi – a series of 
documents signed by a representative of the British Crown and more than 500 Maori 
chiefs in 1840.122  However, close analysis of the events surrounding British assertion of 
sovereignty in New Zealand including the signing of the Treaty and its subsequent 
interpretation by the courts, and today, by Parliament, indicates a less than idyllic picture.  
We argue here that the ideology of the Doctrine of Discovery, rather than cession, has 
been alive and well in New Zealand’s legislature and courts since their origin.  New 
Zealand has been, and continues to be, caught in the colonial web of the Doctrine in a 
similar manner to other British colonized countries, including the United States.  This is 
shown in four instances.  The first part focuses on the annexation of New Zealand; the 
second part on an early case to consider the Treaty and the common law, R v Symonds;123 
the third part on a case that overtly embraced Discovery, Wi Parata;124 and, the last part 
on a contemporary case that banished the Discovery mindset in 2003, Ngati Apa,125 only 
for Parliament to resurrect it. 
  Before delving into this content, it is imperative to provide a short glimpse of this 
southern hemisphere country.  Aotearoa/New Zealand constitutes of two large islands 
(the North Island and the South Island), a smaller third island (Stewart Island), and 
numerous other small islets.  The majority of the population live on the North Island (and 
this was similarly true prior to the arrival of the Europeans). The lands were first 
discovered and peopled by the Maori tribes sometime on or after AD 800.126  It is a 
mountainous landscape, densely forested with a comparatively cooler climate to the 
Pacific Islands.  It swarmed with birds (many flightless) and teemed with fish.  Grouped 
into distinct peoples, the Maori tribes became, literally, the people of the land.  The 
common language (with regional dialectal differences) captured this interrelationship. For 
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instance, hapu means sub-tribe and to be pregnant; whanau means family and to give 
birth; and whenua means land and afterbirth.  Of the about forty distinct iwi (tribes), and 
hundreds of hapu, each derived their identity from the mountains, rivers, and lakes.127   
New Zealand is a unicameral country.  Its appeal courts constitute (in order): the 
High Court, Court of Appeal, and since 2002, the Supreme Court (prior to 2002, the 
Privy Council was New Zealand’s last judicial bastion).128  Under its constitutional 
system, Parliament is supreme and has no formal limits to its law-making power.129  The 
Treaty of Waitangi is not part of the domestic law.  Since the 1980s, the Treaty is 
commonly said to form part of its informal constitution along with the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 and the Constitution Act 1986.  Therefore, for the judiciary or those 
acting under the law, the Treaty itself usually only becomes relevant if it has been 
expressly incorporated into statute.  Even so, statutory incorporation of the Treaty has 
been a relatively recent phenomenon.  It was once endorsed in the courts “as a simply 
nullity.”130  It was not until the 1970s, when Maori visibly took action to highlight Treaty 
breaches, that the Treaty began to gain mainstream recognition and, in turn, the attention 
of those in Parliament and the judiciary. 
At one level New Zealand’s colonial experiences resonate strongly with 
Indigenous peoples’ experiences in Canada, Australia, and the United States.  British 
colonization undeniably shattered who Maori were; disease and warfare decimated the 
population and legislation criminalized the Maori way of life.  But the tools for 
colonization and the recent remedies to overcome the disasters of colonization are in 
many ways unique to this South-West Pacific island country.  There exists a single treaty 
of cession, the Treaty of Waitangi, and legal institutions with counterparts not found 
elsewhere: the Maori Land Court and the Waitangi Tribunal.  Today, Maori, as a 
significant and visible component of the population (currently constituting over 15 per 
cent of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s 4 million people), are rebuilding their communities and 
ways of knowing.  This part of this Article focuses on the permeance of the Doctrine of 
Discovery in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
 
A. Claiming Sovereignty: 1840 
 
 In 1840, the British claimed sovereignty of the lands through a mix of Doctrine of 
Discovery principles and the partially signed Treaty of Waitangi.  Following the British 
explorer Captain James Cook’s first visit to and circumnavigation of Aotearoa in 1779, 
European (consisting mostly of British and to a lesser extent French) explorers, whalers 
and missionaries began arriving, bringing with them their own distinct worldview, 
technology, goods and animals.  In the 1830s two European countries were seriously 
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interested in claiming sovereignty of all, or parts, of New Zealand: Britain and France.  
Britain strategically acknowledged the independent sovereignty of some of the Maori 
tribes in 1835,131 and then set about annexation.  There is no clear date upon which New 
Zealand became a British colony. The whole process has been described as “tortuous,”132 
and involved six or so interrelated events. 
 The first concerned the Letters Patent of June 15 1839 which amended the 
Commission of the Governor of New South Wales by enlarging this Australian colony to 
include “any territory which is or may be acquired in sovereignty by Her Majesty . . . 
within that group of Islands in the Pacific Ocean, commonly called New Zealand . . . .”133  
The appointment of Captain Hobson as Lieutenant-Governor of the New Zealand 
dependency on January 14 1840 constituted the second event.  The third draws attention 
to the three Proclamations published by Gipps on January 19 1840 proclaiming 1) that the 
jurisdiction of the New South Wales Governor extended to New Zealand; 2) that the 
oaths of office had been administered to Hobson as Lieutenant-Governor; and 3) that no 
title to land in New Zealand purchased henceforth would be recognized unless derived 
from the Crown and that Commissioners would be appointed to investigate past 
purchases of land from Maori.134  The initial signing of a “treaty of cession” at Waitangi 
on February 6 1840 is taken as the fourth event.  The fifth concerns Hobson’s 
Proclamations of full British sovereignty over all of New Zealand on May 21 1840.  The 
sixth is the ratification of Hobson’s Proclamations by their publication in the London 
Gazette on October 2 1840.135 
To explore a little further, by the late 1830s, Britain officially sought to pursue 
sovereignty of New Zealand via means of cession if possible (treaty-making was in 
vogue at that time for both British and French colonialists) or, if necessary, by asserting 
Discovery.  On 14 August 1839, the British Government issued instructions to Captain 
Hobson in New Zealand stating: 
 
we acknowledge New Zealand as a Sovereign and independent State, so far at 
least as it is possible to make that acknowledgement in favour of a people 
composed of numerous, dispersed, and petty Tribes, who possess few 
political relations to each other, and are incompetent to act, or even to 
deliberate, in concert.  But the admission of their rights, though inevitably 
qualified by this consideration, is binding on the faith of the British Crown.  
                                                          
131 To read the Declaration of Independence and commentary, see CLAUDIA ORANGE, AN ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 13-16 (2004).  
132 David V. Williams, The Foundation of Colonial Rule in New Zealand, 13 NEW ZEALAND UNIVS. L. 
REV. 54, 56 (1988). 
133 David V. Williams, The Annexation of New Zealand to New South Wales in 1840: What of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, 2 AUSTRALIAN J. L. & SOC. 41, 41-42 (1985) (citing A.H. MCLINTOCK, CROWN COLONY 
GOVERNMENT IN NEW ZEALAND 49 (1958)). 
134 David V. Williams, The Annexation of New Zealand to New South Wales in 1840: What of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, 2 AUSTRALIAN J. L. & SOC. 41, 41-42 (1985) (citing 3 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 
COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, SESSIONS 1835-42 (1970)). 
135 The six events are set forth and explored in David V. Williams, The Foundation of Colonial Rule in New 
Zealand, 13 NEW ZEALAND UNIVS. L. REV. 54 (1988). 
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The Queen, in common with Her Majesty’s immediate predecessor, 
disclaims, for herself and for her subjects, every pretension to seize on the 
islands of New Zealand, or to govern them as a part of the Dominion of Great 
Britain, unless the free and intelligent consent of the Natives, expressed 
according to their established usages, shall be first obtained.136 
 
Hobson immediately sought further directions, claiming in his letter to the Colonial 
Office that the development of the inhabitants of the North and South Islands was 
“essentially different” and that “with the wild savages in the Southern Islands, it appears 
scarcely possible to observe even the form of a Treaty.”137 He suggested that he might be 
permitted to claim the south by right of Discovery.  Apparently Hobson had never been to 
the South Island.  The rationale for such a stance probably lay in the fact that the French 
had a foothold in parts of the South Island, notably at Akaroa on the Banks Peninsula.  
Lord Normanby, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in his reply of 15 August 1839, 
said that if, as Hobson supposed, South Island Maori were incapable “from their 
ignorance of entering intelligently into the Treaty with the Crown” then he might assert 
sovereignty on the grounds of Discovery.138 
 The ‘treaty of cession’ in English and Maori was presented for signing at 
Waitangi, a small settlement in the north of the North Island, in early February 1840.  
Forty-three Maori chiefs, mostly from the northern tribe Nga Puhi, assented to the Maori 
version of the Treaty on February 6.  Hobson, and his party, then traveled through the 
North Island seeking more signatures.  In May 1840, Hobson learned that the New 
Zealand Company settlement at Port Nicholson (now Wellington) had decided to pre-
empt the Treaty process and establish its own form of government.  Infuriated by this, 
Hobson immediately issued two proclamations of sovereignty, one over the North Island 
‘by right of cession’ and the other over the South Island ‘by right of discovery.’139  The 
proclamations were made on May 21 1840.  Meanwhile, Major Thomas Bunbury, under 
orders from Hobson, had proceeded to the South Island to seek signatures if possible to 
the Treaty of Waitangi.  On May 30 1840, two Maori chiefs of the Ngai Tahu tribe signed 
the Treaty at Akaroa.  Bunbury then traveled down to the smaller southern Stewart 
Island, and landed at a part uninhabited.  He duly proclaimed British sovereignty over 
Stewart Island based on Cook’s Discovery.  Bunbury began his return journey calling in 
at a very small offshore island, Ruapuku Island, and successfully attained the signature of 
three Maori chiefs on June 10 1840.  Two chiefs at the Maori village at Tairaroa, at the 
head of the Otago harbour, marked the third and final signature point in the South Island.  
                                                          
136 As reported by the Waitangi Tribunal. 2 Ngai Tahu Report (Wai 27) 219 (1991). 
 
137 Id. 215. 
138 Id. at 215-16. 
139 See Tipene O’Regan, The Ngai Tahu Claim, in WAITANGI: MAORI & PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE 
TREATY OF WAITANGI 300-12 (I.H. Kawharu ed., 1989).  See also CLAUDIA ORANGE, THE TREATY OF 
WAITANGI 58 (1987); WALKER, KA WHAWHAI TONU MATOU, supra note 126 at 97, noting ting that 
Hobson “proclaimed South Island on the basis that it was terra nullius, thereby ignoring the existence of 
the Ngai Tahu.  Only the arrogance born of metropolitan society and the colonizing ethos of the British 
Empire was capable of such self-deception, which was hardly excused by the desire to beat the imminent 
arrival of the French at Akaroa.”). 
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Calling in at Cloudy Bay, on June 17 1840, Bunbury formally proclaimed the British 
Queen’s sovereignty over the South Island based on cession.140  
The Treaty of Waitangi is a short document, consisting of three articles expressed 
in English and Maori.  The controversy today lies in the translation of the first two 
articles.141  According to the English version, Maori ceded to the Crown absolutely and 
without reservation all the rights and powers of sovereignty (article 1), but retained full 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries and 
other properties (article 2).  In contrast, in the Maori version, Maori ceded to the Crown 
governance only (article 1), and retained tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty) over their 
taonga (treasures).  Article 2 granted the Crown a pre-emptive right to purchase property 
from Maori, and article 3 granted Maori the same rights and privileges as British citizens 
living in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The English version of the Treaty encapsulates the 
principles of the Doctrine of Discovery; the Maori version purports a blueprint for a 
different type of future bound more in respectful separation. 
 The bilingual treaty of cession was certainly a unique contractual agreement not 
replicated elsewhere.142  Humanitarian interests,143 along with the need to control the 
unruly behavior of some of the new settlers, and to keep at bay the interests of France and 
to a lesser extent the United States of America, contributed to the British desire for a 
signed treaty.  Maori chiefs signed for similarly numerous reasons.  On the face of it, the 
Treaty looked as if it was asking little of them and offering them much in return.  They 
expected trade to increase, to receive assistance in handling the new changes occurring in 
society, and “not least, the possibility of manipulating British authority in inter-tribal 
rivalries.”144   
                                                          
140 See ORANGE, THE TREATY, supra note 139, at 60-91; Tipene O’Regan, The Ngai Tahu Claim, in 
WAITANGI:  MAORI & PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 239-42 (I.H. Kawharu ed., 
1989); Waitangi Tribunal, Ngai Tahu Report 1991.  Vol 2 (Wai 27, 1991). 
141 For an analysis of the textual problems with the Treaty, see Bruce Biggs, Humpty-Dumpty and the 
Treaty of Waitangi, in WAITANGI:  MAORI & PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 300-12 
(I.H. Kawharu ed., 1989); R.M. Ross, Te Tiriti o Waitangi.  Texts and Translations, 6(2) NEW ZEALAND J. 
HISTORY 129 (1972) (also reprinted in THE SHAPING OF HISTORY: ESSAYS FROM THE NEW ZEALAND 
JOURNAL OF HISTORY (Judith Binney ed., 2001).  
142 See William Renwick, A Variation of a Theme, in SOVEREIGNTY & INDIGENOUS RIGHTS: THE TREATY 
OF WAITANGI IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS 199, 207 (William Renwick ed., 1991) (explaining that by the 
time the treaties were signed on Vancouver Island, BC, Canada - a mere decade later - “British imperial 
policy was determined by strategic considerations not humanitarian intentions”).  See also Caren Wickliffe, 
Te Timatanga: Maori Women’s Access to Justice 8(2) YEARBOOK OF NEW ZEALAND JURISPRUDENCE 
SPECIAL ISSUE – TE PURENGA 217, 229 (2005) (asserting that “The Treaty of Waitangi is fundamentally 
different to treaties in the Americas … did not deal with the sovereign status of indigenous polities”). 
143 In particular see the instructions issued by the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office 
responsible for British policy in New Zealand, James Stephen.  PETER ADAMS, THE FATAL NECESSITY: 
BRITISH INTERVENTION IN NEW ZEALAND 1830-1847 (1977); David V. Williams, The Annexation of New 
Zealand to New South Wales in 1840: What of the Treaty of Waitangi, 2 AUSTRALIAN J. L. & SOC. 41 
(1985). 
144 ORANGE, THE TREATY, supra note 139, at 58.  Note that a colonial government was established in 1852 
pursuant to the Constitution Act 1852.  For more discussion see PETER SPILLER, JEREMY FINN, RICHARD 
BOAST  (eds), A NEW ZEALAND LEGAL HISTORY (2d ed., 2001). 
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Nonetheless, while the shiny surface of the day may well have reflected a treaty 
of cession, the Maori version did not and neither did other colonial actions at the time.  
The inconsistencies lead us to argue here that the English version of the Treaty provided 
a harmonious gloss of overt cession, whereas the reality lies deeper in the covert Doctrine 
of Discovery-type actions pursued by the British colonials.  For instance, there are the 
proclamations made pre- the drafting and initial signing of the Treaty; there is Hobson’s 
instruction to seek signatures from South Island Maori followed by his proclamation of 
discovery over the South Island because those Maori are uncivilized; and, not all Maori 
chiefs signed the Treaty therefore leaving large tracts of land outside the province of 
cession despite proclamations asserting cession over the whole country.  Even taking a 
liberal view of the English version of the Treaty, it is questionable whether it does more 
than the common law principle of Discovery.145   
 
B.  Symonds 1847  
 
Following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, the British had begun to make 
serious inroads into acquiring large tracts of land for British settlement.  At issue were 
those Europeans who had purchased land directly from Maori prior to 1840.  Did they 
hold a valid title?  The purchasers argued yes because the British Crown had recognized 
the sovereignty of Maori – in the Declaration of Independence and in seeking a treaty of 
cession – and therefore Maori must be deemed to have had “the power to alienate land 
like any other sovereign.”146  The argument found no favor, and as Dr. Paul McHugh 
observed “showed the extent to which the American case-law had disseminated through 
the colonies.”147  The issue of individuals’ rights to purchase land from Maori post 1840 
was settled by R v Symonds.148  
In 1847, this case served to reinforce the sovereign rights of Britain in New 
Zealand.  The facts of the case are similar to Johnson v M’Intosh, where the U.S. 
Supreme Court refused to recognize the validity in law of title to land purchased by 
individuals directly from the Indian owners.  In Symonds, essentially, a British individual 
purchased land directly from Maori in accordance with a certificate issued by Governor 
Fitz Roy allowing him to do so.  The question that occupied the courts was whether the 
individual, Mr. C Hunter McIntosh, had acquired legal title to the property?  Both judges 
sitting on the case said no, and both did so by drawing on United States jurisprudence.  
This case is said to represent the foundational principles of the common law relating to 
                                                          
145 Thus we would dispute P.G McHugh’s claims that “the Crown’s acquisition of the sovereignty of New 
Zealand was premised at all times on the original sovereignty of the Maori chiefs” and “[t]he Crown thus 
recognized the original sovereignty of Maori over New Zealand.  In moving towards the acquisition of 
sovereignty the Colonial office considered and rejected the possibility of an approach resembling 
Marshall’s ‘doctrine of discovery’ which would have allowed the Crown to issue constituent instruments 
without reference to Maori consent.”  P.G. MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL SOCIETIES AND THE COMMON LAW: A 
HISTORY OF SOVEREIGNTY, STATUS, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 166-67 (2004).  
146 Id. at 168. 
147 Id.  
148 (1847) N.Z.P.C.C. 387. 
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Maori.149  It was the first case to explicitly rely on the Doctrine of Discovery ideology in 
New Zealand law.   
The most famous quote in the case is that stated by Justice Chapman: 
 
Whatever may be the opinion of jurists as to the strength or weakness of the 
Native title, whatsoever may have been the past vague notions of the Natives of 
this country; whatever may be their present clearer and still growing 
conception of their own dominion over land, it cannot be too solemnly asserted 
that it is entitled to be respected, and it cannot be extinguished (at least in 
times of peace) otherwise than by the free consent of the Native occupiers.  But 
for their protection, and for the sake of humanity, the Government is bound to 
maintain, and the Courts to assert, the Queen’s exclusive right to extinguish it.  
It follows from what has been said, that in solemnly guaranteeing the Native 
title, and in securing what is called the Queen’s pre-emptive right, the Treaty of 
Waitangi, confirmed by the Charter of the Colony, does not assert either in 
doctrine or in practice any thing new and unsettled.150 
 
The case held that the Queen had the exclusive right of pre-emption to purchase 
land from Maori as articulated in the Treaty.  Justice Chapman observed that the 
“intercourse of civilised nations”151 (namely, Great Britain) with Indigenous 
communities (especially in North America) had led to established principles of law.  This 
law, founded in the Doctrine of Discovery and encapsulated in the common law doctrine 
of native title, stipulates that the Queen’s preemptive right is exclusive.  Thus, the Crown 
is the sole source of title for settlers.  This was the exact same outcome as in Johnson.  
Both judges in Symonds relied heavily on the U.S. Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
judgm
an stated in an 1840 article, in reference to Johnson and 
orcester v. Georgia:153 
 
occupation, or amounted to something deserving the name of sovereignty, 
                                                          
ents.152 
Justice Chapman, in particular, had been following the United States Supreme 
Court decisions.  Chapm
W
discovery gave the Government by whose subjects or authority it was made, a 
title to the country and a sole right of acquiring land from the natives, as 
against all European powers. . . . it must be clear, that the rights reserved to 
the native tribes could only be of modified character, but whether those rights 
were abridged or extensive – whether they were confined to a  mere right of 
149 See, e.g., Mark Hickford, Settling Some Very Important Principles of Colonial Law: Three ‘Forgotten’ 
Cases of the 1840s, 34 VICTORIA UNIV. WELLINGTON L. REV. 1 (2003). 
150 Symonds (1847) N.Z.P.C.C. 387, 390 (emphasis added). 
151 Id. at 388. 
152 MCHUGH, supra note 145, at 42 (“There is a strong congruence between the styles of reasoning in R v 
Symonds and the Marshall cases”).  
153 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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was a question which did not affect the relation between the discovering 
nation and civilised powers.154 
 
Justice Chapman, in Symonds, observed that in guaranteeing Native title and the 
Queen’s pre-emptive right, “the Treaty of Waitangi . . . does not assert either in doctrine 
or in practice any thing new and unsettled.”155  While this observation could be disputed, 
especially on reading the Maori version,156 the decision marked a covert application of 
the Doctrine of Discovery.  It was to take another 150 years before a court was to hold 
that Maori have proprietary interests in land despite a change in sovereignty. 
 
C.  Wi Parata  1877 
 
 The initial British Governors in Aotearoa/New Zealand exerted a distinct 
colonialist policy based on the assumption that “Maori were unusually intelligent (for 
blacks) and that intelligence translated into the desire to become British.”157  Between 
1840 and 1860 the tools for this evangelism – God, money, law and land – sought to 
convert Maori from ‘savages’ to ‘civilisation’ via assimilation by the “[M]ixing of the 
two peoples geographically.”158  But the early evangelism had few complete successes.  
While many Maori did embrace Christianity, it was not at the exclusion of their own 
religion; “Maori religion had always been open, able to incorporate new gods.”159  
Similarly, while many Maori tribes became commercialized (they dominated the food 
supply market from growing crops, to transporting and selling to the Pakeha), 
individualism did not flourish.160 
 By the late 1850s, however, the worlds of some tribes had been radically changed 
by the now accepted shady land deals.  In less than 20 years after the Treaty was signed, 
the British Crown had acquired most of the land in the South Island and the lower part of 
the North Island (constituting about 60% of New Zealand’s land mass and where about 
10% of Maori lived).161  In most instances the tribes had been duped: on the one hand 
there was controversy about the actual land included in the purchase agreements, and on 
the other hand there was disquiet in that the Crown had not set aside land for reserves for 
                                                          
154 Henry Chapman, The English, the French, and the New Zealanders, THE NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL 49 (4 
April 1840) (reprinted in Mark Hickford, Settling Some Very Important Principles of Colonial Law: Three 
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156 See Eddie Durie, The Treaty in Maori History, in SOVEREIGNTY & INDIGENOUS RIGHTS: THE TREATY OF 
WAITANGI IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS (William Renwick ed., 1991). 
157 James Belich, The Governors and the Maori (1840-72), in THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF NEW 
ZEALAND 78 (Keith Sinclair ed., 2d ed. 1996).  
158 Id. at 80. 
159 Id. at 78. 
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them as per the agreements.162  Deeply disturbed by the correlation between selling land 
and loss of independence, the North Island tribes still with land began turning against 
land sales.  Importantly, the pan-tribal sentiment saw the emergence of the Maori King 
Movement.163  Perturbed that land selling would come to an end, and thus the 
amalgamation of Maori would come to a halt, the British concluded that the ‘law of 
nature’ required help.  A new colonial tool was endorsed in the form of warfare.  Instead, 
in underestimating tribal resistance, the New Zealand wars, which began in March 1860, 
did not abate until a decade later.164  A tougher new evangelism emerged during this time 
with law becoming the central tool in destroying the Maori way of life. 
Large tracts of Maori land in the North Island were confiscated pursuant to 
legislation;165 legislation stipulated that native schools could only receive funding if the 
curriculum was taught in the English language166 (a policy which led to the near 
extinction of the Maori language and culture, and marginalized Maori “by a deliberate 
policy of training for manual labour rather than the professions”167); and legislation 
ensured that any person practicing traditional Maori healing could became liable for 
conviction168 (a policy which led to the loss of much traditional knowledge169).   
At the heart of the new cultural genocide170 crusade was the establishment of the 
Native Land Court.  The Crown now waived its right of pre-emption (as endorsed in the 
Treaty of Waitangi and common law doctrine of native title) in favour of Maori being 
able to freely alienate their land.  The catch being, they first had to obtain a certificate of 
title.  The system sought to transform land communally held by whanau and hapu (Maori 
customary land) into individualized titles derived from the Crown (Maori freehold title).  
The preamble to the Native Lands Act 1862 explained:  
 
whereas it would greatly promote the peaceful settlement of the Colony and the 
advancement and civilization of the Natives if their rights to land were 
ascertained defined and declared and if the ownership of such lands . . . were 
                                                          
162 See, e.g., Waitangi Tribunal, Ngai Tahu Report 1991.  Vol 2 (Wai 27, 1991); Tipene O’Regan, The Ngai 
Tahu Claim, in WAITANGI: MAORI & PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 300-12 (I.H. 
Kawharu ed., 1989).   
163 For a discussion of Maori resistance movements, including the Maori King Movement, see LINDSAY 
COX, KOTAHITANGA: THE SEARCH FOR MAORI POLITICAL UNITY (1993).   
164 See JAMES BELICH, THE NEW ZEALAND WARS (1998). 
165 See New Zealand Settlements Act 1863, and Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863. 
166 See Native Schools Act 1858; Native Schools Act 1867 and the Native Schools Act 1871. 
167 Stephanie Milroy & Leah Whiu, Waikato Law School: An Experiment in Bicultural Legal Education, 8 
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168 See the Tohunga Suppression Act 1908. 
169 See Maui Solomon, The Wai 262 Claim: A Claim by Maori to Indigenous Flora and Fauna: Me o Ratou 
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170 For a discussion of this term see D Williams, Myths, National Origins, Common Law and the Waitangi 
Tribunal, 11 MURDOCH UNIV. ELECTRONIC J. L. (2004) (view at 
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assimilated as nearly as possible to the ownership of land according to British 
law.171   
 
The legislation ensured “Maori could participate in the new British prosperity only by 
selling or leasing their land”.172 Or, as Hon. Sewell, a Member of the House 
Representatives in 1870, reflected, the Act had two objects.  One was “to bring the great 
bulk of the lands of the Northern Island which belonged to the Natives . . . within the 
reach of colonization.”173  The other was:  
 
the detribalisation of the Natives, - to destroy, if it were possible, the principles 
of communism which ran through the whole of their institutions, upon which 
their social system was based, and which stood as a barrier in the way of all 
attempts to amalgamate the Native race into our own social and political 
system.174   
 
The Doctrine of Discovery ideology was obviously permeating deeply into the colonial 
mindsets.  The Land Court was extraordinarily effective.  In the early years:  
 
a predatory horde of storekeepers, grog-sellers, surveyors, lawyers, land-agents 
and money-lenders made advances to rival groups of Maori claimants and 
recouped the costs in land.  Rightful Maori owners could not avoid litigation 
and expensive surveys if false claims were put forward, since Fenton [the Chief 
Judge], seeking to inflate the status of the Court, insisted that judgments be 
based only upon evidence presented before it.175 
 
By the 1930s very little tribal land remained in Maori ownership (today it amounts to 5 
per cent of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s total landmass).  The Court’s early work has been 
described as a “veritable engine of destruction for any tribe’s tenure of land,”176 “a 
scandal,”177 and the conquering of a people by pen, not sword.178    
                                                          
171 Preamble of the Native Lands Act 1862.  See also Native Lands Act 1865. 
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By the late 1870s, the now-named High Court, in line with the new evangelism, 
began to rewrite history.  The Court, in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington,179 denied 
Maori had sovereignty prior to 1840 and thus rejected the Treaty of Waitangi as a valid 
treaty.  In doing so, the Doctrine of Discovery came to the forefront of judicial reasoning. 
The facts of the case start in 1848 when the chief of the Ngati Toa tribe sought to 
give tribal land at Witireia as an endowment for a school to be established there to 
educate the tribal children.  The chief accordingly entered into a verbal arrangement with 
the then Lord Bishop of New Zealand.  In 1850, a Crown grant was made, without the 
knowledge or consent of the tribe, to the Lord Bishop.  The grant stated that the land had 
been ceded from Ngati Toa for the school.  However, no school of any kind was ever 
established.  The tribe sued seeking return of the land.  Chief Judge Prendergast ruled in 
favor of the Crown grant and relied on a new version of historical events. 
 
On the foundation of this colony, the aborigines were found without any kind 
of civil government, or any settled system of law.  There is no doubt that 
during a series of years the British Government desired and endeavoured to 
recognize the independent nationality of New Zealand.  But the thing neither 
existed nor at the time could be established.  The Maori tribes were incapable 
of performing the duties, and therefore of assuming the rights, of a civilised 
community.180 
 
Prendergast stressed that Britain had queried the capacity of Maori and pointed to 
the direction made by the British Government to Captain Hobson: 
 
we acknowledge New Zealand as a sovereign and independent state, so far at 
least as it is possible to make that acknowledgement in favour of a people 
composed of numerous, dispersed, and petty tribes, who possess few political 
relations to each other, and are incompetent to act, or even to deliberate, in 
concert.181 
 
 Prendergast says in reference to this passage: 
 
Such a qualification nullifies the proposition to which it is annexed.  In fact, the 
Crown was compelled to assume in relation to the Maori tribes, and in relation 
to native land titles, these rights and duties which, jure gentium, vest in and 
devolve upon the first civilised occupier of a territory thinly peopled by 
barbarians without any form of law or civil government.182 
 
 Prendergast then reviewed the Land Claims Ordinance of 1841 and concluded: 
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They express the well-known legal incidents of a settlement planted by a 
civilised Power in the midst of uncivilised tribes.  It is enough to refer, once for 
all, to the American jurists, Kent and Story, who, together with Chief Justice 
Marshall, in the well-known case of Johnson v McIntosh, have given the most 
complete exposition of this subject.183 
 
 He then goes on at length to state: 
 
Had any body of law or custom, capable of being understood and administered 
by the Courts of a civilised country, been known to exist, the British 
Government would surely have provided for its recognition, since nothing 
could exceed the anxiety displayed to infringe no just right of the aborigines.  
On the cession of territory by one civilised power to another, the rights of 
private property are invariably respected, and the old law of the country is 
administered, to such extent as may be necessary, by the Courts of the new 
sovereign.  In this way British tribunals administer the old French law in Lower 
Canada, the Code Civil in the island of Mauritius, and Roman-Dutch law in 
Ceylon, in Guinea, and at the Cape.  But in the case of primitive barbarians, the 
supreme executive Government must acquit itself, as best it may, of its 
obligation to respect native proprietary rights, and of necessity must be the sole 
arbiter of its own justice.184 
 
 These sentiments are a direct application of United States case law.  In particular, 
a very similar passage exists in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.185 
 
In reference to the Treaty of Waitangi, he states: 
 
So far indeed as that instrument purported to cede the sovereignty – a matter 
with which we are not here directly concerned – it must be regarded as a simple 
nullity.  No body politic existed capable of making cession of sovereignty, nor 
could the thing itself exist.  So far as the proprietary rights of the natives are 
concerned, the so-called treaty merely affirms the rights and obligations which, 
jure gentium, vested in and devolved upon the Crown under the circumstances of 
the case.186 
 
 Prendergast refers to American authorities and expressly likens “the case of the 
Maoris” to “that of the Indian tribes of North America.”187  He concludes “the title of the 
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Crown to the country was acquired, jure gentium, by discovery and priority of 
occupation, as a territory inhabited only by savages.”188 
 
At the turn of the century the Privy Council deemed such reasoning as going “too 
far,”189 however, Aotearoa/New Zealand’s judiciary ignored the Privy Council - “the 
only recorded instance of a New Zealand Court’s publicly avowing its disapproval of a 
superior tribunal.”190  Later, in 1941, the Privy Council reinterpreted the Treaty as 
enforceable in the courts if recognized in legislation.191  This did not occur until 1975, 
and, in regard to the status of the doctrine of Native Title, it was not fully reinstated into 
Aotearoa/New Zealand’s common law until 2003. 
  
D.  Ngati Apa 2003   
 
 In the 1980s the High Court began to rectify the Wi Parata precedent and 
reintroduce a more apt application of the doctrine of Native Title into Aotearoa/New 
Zealand’s common law.  The Native Title Doctrine, according to a 1920s Privy Council 
decision, essentially proclaims that “A mere change in sovereignty is not to be presumed 
as meant to disturb rights of private owners; and the general terms of a cession are prima 
facie to be construed accordingly.”192  In 1987, the New Zealand High Court held that a 
Maori person has a right to take undersized shellfish, paua (abalone), even though it was 
in contravention of legislation, because no statute had plainly and clearly extinguished 
the customary right.193  Judge Williamson distinguished the earlier case law which 
purported a Wi Parata type reasoning (namely the Court of Appeal’s In re the Ninety-
Mile Beach194 decision) because this case was “not based upon ownership of land or 
upon an exclusive right to a foreshore or bank of a river.”195  Subsequent case law in the 
1990s reinforced the existence of the common law doctrine of Native Title in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, but did not accept the arguments posed under it.  For example, 
the Court of Appeal, in 1994, concluded that not under the doctrine (nor under the Treaty 
of Waitangi) do Maori have a right to generate electricity by the use of water power.196  
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In 1999, by majority, the Court of Appeal held that Maori are not permitted to claim 
under the doctrine (or under the Treaty) a customary right to fish for introduced 
specie
anadian and Australian case law in devising the nature of Native Title.  He explained 
the do
 
e vests in the Crown.  But, at least in the absence of special 
circumstances displacing the principle, the radical title is subject to the existing 
recognized specific public purposes but upon 
xtinguishment proper compensation must be paid.200  Cooke P then explained the scope 
of Na
 
fee recognised at 
common law.  At the other extreme they may be treated as at best a mere 
p
nder salt-water.  The 
unanimous decision contributed significantly to the removal of the full force of the 
Doctrine of Discovery.  All five judges overruled Wi Parata.203   
s.197   
In the 1994 case, Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua,198 Cooke P referred to 
C
ctrine: 
On the acquisition of the territory, whether by settlement, cession or 
annexation, the colonising power acquires a radical or underlying title which 
goes with sovereignty.  Where the colonising power has been the United 
Kingdom, that titl
native rights.199   
 
Cooke P elaborated on the nature of Native Title rights stating that: they are usually 
communal; cannot be extinguished (at least in times of peace) otherwise than by the free 
consent of the native occupiers; can only be transferred to the Crown; the transfer must 
be in strict compliance with the provisions of any relevant statutes; it is likely to be in 
breach of fiduciary duty if an extinguishment occurs by less than fair conduct or on less 
than fair terms; and if extinguishment is deemed necessary then free consent may have to 
yield to compulsory acquisition for 
e
tive Title in terms of a spectrum:  
The nature and incidents of aboriginal title are matters of fact dependent on the 
evidence in any particular case. . . . At one extreme they may be treated as 
approaching the full rights of proprietorship of an estate in 
ermissive and apparently arbitrarily revocable occupancy.201 
 
In 2003, the Court of Appeal, in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa,202 reintroduced 
the full spectrum of the Native Title doctrine, accepting the possibility that native title 
could encompass land either permanently or temporarily u
                                                          
197 McRitchie v. Taranaki Fish and Game Council, [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 139.  Note Justice Thomas’ strong 
dissent.  The third case to discuss the doctrine in the 1990s was Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc. v. 
 N.Z.L.R. 641.   
8 [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 20. 
4. 
 24. 




199 Id. at 23-2
200 Id. at
201 Id.   
202 [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643. 
20
 37
Significantly, the Ngati Apa decision, explicitly foresaw the possibility of the 
doctrine of Native Title recognizing Indigenous peoples’ exclusive ownership of the 
foreshore and seabed following a change in sovereignty.  For example, Chief Justice 
Elias stated: “Any property interest of the Crown in land over which it acquired 
sovereignty therefore depends on any pre-existing customary interest and its nature,”204 
and “[t]he content of such customary interest is a question of fact discoverable, if 
necessary, by evidence.”205  Elias CJ explained “[a]s a matter of custom the burden on 
the Crown’s radical title might be limited to use or occupation rights held as a matter of 
custom,”206 or, and she quotes from a Privy Council decision, Amodu Tijani v Secretary, 
Southern Nigeria,207 they might “be so complete as to reduce any radical right in the 
Sovereign to one which only extends to comparatively limited rights of administrative 
interference.”208  Elias CJ substantiated this possibility with reference to Canada: 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has had occasion recently to consider the 
content of customary property interests in that country.  It has recognised that, 
according to the custom on which such rights are based, they may extend from 
usufructuary rights to exclusive ownership with incidents equivalent to those 
recognised by fee simple title.209  
 
The other four justices discussed the common law doctrine of Native Title in similar 
terms. For example, Tipping J began his judgment with the words: “When the common 
law of England came to New Zealand its arrival did not extinguish Maori customary title 
. . . title to it must be lawfully extinguished before it can be regarded as ceasing to 
exist.”210  Keith and Anderson JJ, in a joint judgment, emphasized “the onus of proving 
extinguishment lies on the Crown and the necessary purpose must be clear and plain.”211  
Moreover, Gault P expressly recognized the uniqueness of New Zealand in the existence 
of the common law jurisdiction of Native Title and the statutory jurisdiction of Maori 
customary land status and stated that he prefers to “reserve the question of whether it is a 
real distinction insofar as each is directed to interests of land in the nature of 
ownership.”212   
 Interestingly, the judges refer back to Johnson.213  Chief Justice Elias quotes 
Johnson, recognizing that according to the Supreme Court of the United States, Native 
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Title rights “were rights at common law, not simply moral claims against the Crown.”214  
Keith and Anderson JJ rely extensively on the early United States jurisprudence, 
including citing at length from Johnson.  For instance, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words: 
 
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives, as 
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and 
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power 
to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives.  These grants have 
been understood by all, to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the 
Indian right of occupancy.215 
 
The reasoning in Ngati Apa may be the best yet to be made by a judiciary, at least 
in the Commonwealth.  It poignantly recognizes the interests of Indigenous peoples.  For 
example, Elias CJ stated: 
 
The common law as received in New Zealand was modified by recognised 
Maori customary property interests.  If any such custom is shown to give 
interests in foreshore and seabed, there is no room for a contrary presumption 
derived from English common law.  The common law of New Zealand is 
different.216 
 
 The reasoning in the Ngati Apa decision suggests acceptance of the fact that the 
common law of New Zealand is unique.  Chief Justice Elias stressed this reality: 
 
In British territories with native populations, the introduced common law 
adapted to reflect local custom, including property rights.  That approach was 
applied in New Zealand in 1840.  The laws of England were applied in New 
Zealand only ‘so far as applicable to the circumstances thereof’ . . . from the 
beginning the common law of New Zealand as applied in the Courts differed 
from the common law of England because it reflected local circumstances.217 
 
The Court did not proceed to answer whether specific tribes exclusively held land 
under salt water because the case had been brought on whether the Maori Land Court had 
jurisdiction to determine whether the foreshore and seabed was Maori customary land (a 
land status rather than a Native Title issue).  All five judges held that the Maori Land 
Court did have the necessary jurisdiction to consider such an application.  
Before the Maori Land Court had an opportunity to do so, the Labour-led 
Government announced its intention to enact clear and plain legislation asserting Crown 
ownership of the foreshore and seabed.  In response to the Government’s position, 
                                                          
214 Ngati Apa [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, at 652. 
 
215 As reproduced Keith and Anderson JJ in Ngati Apa, id. at 680. 
 
216 Id. at 668.  
217 Id. at 562. 
 39
outlined in a report released in December 2003,218 many Maori groups in protest at the 
policy lodged an urgent claim with the Waitangi Tribunal.  There they argued that the 
policy if enacted would constitute a serious breach of the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi and wider norms of domestic and international law.  The Tribunal agreed.  It 
stated, in its March 2004 report, that the policy gave rise to serious prejudice which by 
“cutting off their access to the courts and effectively expropriating their property rights, 
puts them in a class different from and inferior to all other citizens.”219  Despite the 
Tribunal’s strong recommendations for continued consultation between Government and 
Maori, the Government rejected the report’s central conclusions as based on “dubious or 
incorrect assumptions.”220  The Government stressed the notion of Parliamentary 
sovereignty – the idea that Aotearoa/New Zealand’s Parliament is supreme and is 
unhindered in its law-making abilities. 
Section 3 of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 states its object is to: 
 
preserve the public foreshore and seabed in perpetuity as the common heritage 
of all New Zealanders in a way that enables the protection by the Crown of the 
public foreshore and seabed on behalf of all the people of New Zealand, 
including the protection of the association of whanau, hapu, and iwi with areas 
of the public foreshore and seabed.221 
 
First, the Act vests the land in Crown ownership: “the full legal and beneficial ownership 
of the public foreshore and seabed is vested in the Crown, so that the public foreshore 
and seabed is held by the Crown as its absolute property.”222  Then, it replaces the Maori 
Land Court’s jurisdiction to issue land status orders with a new jurisdiction to issue 
customary rights orders, and, replaces the High Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine 
the common law doctrine of Native Title with a new jurisdiction to determine territorial 
customary rights.223  
The Government’s handling of the foreshore and seabed issue angered many 
Maori.  Protests included a successful claim to the United Nations;224 a hikoi (march) of 
                                                          
218 Summary of the Foreshore and Seabed Framework (2003), available at 
www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/summary.cfm. 
219 Waitangi Tribunal, Report on the Crown’s Foreshore and Seabed Policy xiv-xv (Wai 1071, 2004). 
220 Deputy Prime Minister Michael Cullen’s official speech, ‘Waitangi Tribunal Report Disappointing’ (8 
March 2004), available at: www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=19091.  
221 Section 3 of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. 
 
222 Section 13(1) of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004.  Note that the ‘public foreshore and seabed’ is 
defined as meaning the foreshore and seabed but does not include any land that is, for the time being, 
subject to a specified freehold interest’, see section 5. 
223 See Parts 3 and 4 of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004.  For commentary on this Act and its 
background see, e.g., RICHARD BOAST, FORESHORE AND SEABED (2005); Nin Tomas and Karensa Johnston, 
Ask that Taniwha Who Owns the Foreshore and Seabed of Aotearoa, 1 TE TAI HARURU/JOURNAL OF 
MAORI LEGAL WRITING 10 (2004); F.M. (Jock) Brookfield, Maori Claims and the ‘Special’ Juridical 
Nature of Foreshore and Seabed, NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 179 (2005); PG McHugh, Aboriginal Title in New 
Zealand: A Retrospect and Prospect, 2 NEW ZEALAND J. PUBLIC & INT’L L. 139 (2004).  
224 The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the New Zealand 
 40
about 20,000 Maori on Parliament grounds; and the resignation of a Maori Labour 
Cabinet Minister, Tarina Turia, and her re-election to Parliament as a representative of 
the newly formed Maori Party.  The issue also sparked discussion about reforming New 
Zealand’s constitutional order and, in any such reform, the place of the Treaty of 
Waitangi.225  
  In conclusion, a couple of points need to be made.  One, even though the Ngati 
Apa decision was a bold decision and goes further than the courts in Australia and 
Canada have gone in accepting the possibility of Indigenous peoples’ exclusive 
ownership of land under salt water, it is still premised on the notion that the British 
Crown legitimately acquired sovereignty of New Zealand.  The Court does not canvass 
the possibility that sovereignty may still legitimately lie with some of the Maori tribes.  
Rather, it assumes a transfer in sovereignty has occurred and purports blanket rules as 
applying to all of New Zealand.  Secondly, from the 1980s the New Zealand courts refer 
to Canadian and Australian case law, not United States jurisprudence even though New 
Zealand’s jurisprudence on this point originated in extensive reference to the Marshall 
decisions.  Thirdly, Parliament would not contemplate Indigenous ownership of the 
foreshore or seabed in any form.  In doing so, it has blatantly resurrected the Doctrine of 
Discovery in land under salt water.  While Parliament has acted in contravention of the 
common law, it is able to do so because it is supreme – New Zealand’s courts have no 
power to restrict Parliament’s behavior.  This thus allows for a conclusion to be reached 
here that the Doctrine is still alive in New Zealand. 
 
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
 
We think the best way to compare and contrast the New Zealand and United 
States law on Discovery is to analyze the ten constituent elements of the Doctrine that we 
set out in section one.226  In essence, we are examining whether these countries adopted 
the Doctrine of Discovery, as defined by international and English law, in full or in part. 
 
A.  First discovery  
 
England, its colonies, the American states, and the United States all relied on the 
principle of first discovery to allege land ownership and sovereign rights over American 
Indians.  The Crown used this element in its charters for exploration and colonization.  
Henry VII, for example, directed John Cabot to “discover . . . countries, regions, or 
provinces of the heathen and infidels . . . which before this time have been unknown to all 
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Christians.”227  Similarly, Elizabeth I directed Sir Walter Raleigh “to discouer . . . 
remote, heathen and barbarous lands, countries, and territories, not actually possessed by 
any Christian Prince, nor inhabited by Christian People . . . .”228  And, James I directed 
his subjects to establish a colony on lands “which are not now actually possessed by any 
Christian prince or People . . . .”229   
The colonies also utilized this element.  One English author wrote in 1609 that 
James I’s rights in America were by “right of discovery.”230  Furthermore, in 1638, 
Maryland enacted a law to control Indian land sales and based its legal authority on the 
Crown’s “right of first discovery” in which the King had “became lord and possessor” of 
Maryland.231  Later, the English colonies used England’s claim of “first discovery, 
occupation, and possession”232 to resist the Dutch colonies in the New World. 
After the American Revolution, state governments continued to expressly rely on 
first discovery to define their rights to the lands of Native people.233  In 1785-86, for 
example, Alexander Hamilton represented New York in a land claim versus 
Massachusetts which raised the issue of which state held the preemption power to buy 
certain Indian lands.  In preparing his case, Hamilton created an extensive chart that 
documented the first discoveries and settlements in America of the English, French, and 
Dutch.234  The original thirteen states also based their western land claims, clear to the 
Pacific Ocean, on their Royal charters; charters that were based on the Crown’s authority 
under first discovery. 
The United States also claimed that first discovery gave it ownership and 
sovereign rights over the lands and rights of Native peoples.  Thomas Jefferson 
recognized that an American’s first discovery of the Columbia River in 1792 gave the 
U.S. a claim under international law to the Columbia River and its watershed.235  He also, 
for example, drafted a forty page pamphlet in 1804 tracking the French first discoveries 
in his attempt to determine the boundaries of the Louisiana Territory.236 
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In addition, the United States maintained for more than four decades that it had 
made the first discovery of the Oregon Country.  U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State 
James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, John Calhoun, James Polk, and James 
Buchanan, and many others were involved in diplomatic negotiations with England, 
Spain, and Russia on this issue for over forty years with all sides claiming first 
discovery.237  Moreover, in 1856, Congress enacted a law that Americans could claim 
deserted islands based on first discovery and occupation.238  Plainly, the Crown, colonies, 
American states, and the United States all claimed rights based on first discovery. 
Similarly, in New Zealand the first discovery principles applied.  While a treaty of 
cession was signed with some of the Maori tribes, the Discovery Doctrine pervaded the 
British motivations and subsequent negotiations with Maori.  The British essentially 
considered the lands of New Zealand as ‘unsettled’ until Britain claimed sovereignty.  
This is because the British believed that they first discovered the lands and therefore had 
the sovereign right of the lands whether a treaty of cession was signed or not.239  The 
precedent was first discussed in the Symonds 1847 case, drawing heavily on the United 
States jurisprudence, in particular, on Johnson.  The Court claimed that first discovery 
gave title against all other Europeans.240  Moreover, in Wi Parata, Judge Prendergast 
expressly related this element to New Zealand.  For example, he stated the rights and 
duties under international law, jure gentium, “vest in and devolve upon the first civilized 
occupier.”241  The jure gentium or international law that he was referring to is obviously 
the Doctrine of Discovery. 
It is no surprise that this element of Discovery is identical in New Zealand and the 
United States.  It is an element of the international law that England utilized in colonizing 
both countries and which the colonists in North America and New Zealand adopted to 
control their relationships with the Indigenous peoples.   
  
B.  Actual occupancy and current possession  
 
The English Crown developed the principle that for European countries to turn a 
first discovery into a complete title they had to actually occupy and possess the lands 
within a reasonable amount of time after first discovery.  The Crown and the colonies 
actively applied that element of Discovery in America.242 
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England and the United States also relied on this element in arguments that raged 
for over four decades as they tried to prove their actual occupancy of the Oregon 
Country.  They argued about the significance to their claims to Oregon of the Lewis & 
Clark expedition and John Jacob Astor’s fur post at Astoria, and the activities of the 
English fur companies, the Northwest Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company.243   
Thomas Jefferson was no doubt expressly motivated by this very element of 
Discovery when he directed Lewis & Clark to the mouth of the Columbia River, which 
not coincidentally an American had first discovered in 1792.244  Jefferson was then 
especially delighted in 1808 when American fur trader John Jacob Astor proposed to 
build the first permanent American establishment on the Pacific coast, not accidentally, at 
the mouth of the Columbia River.245  Jefferson realized the significance of these actions 
under the international law of Discovery.  He even argued in 1813 and 1816 that 
America’s claim to the Oregon Country was based on Astor’s permanent occupancy of 
the region by building Astoria in 1811.246 
In the 1820s and 1830s, Senators Thomas Hart Benton and Lewis Linn, 
Congressman Caleb Cushing and numerous others argued for the United States to occupy 
the Oregon Country to perfect its first discovery claim.247  Specifically, Caleb told the 
House of Representatives that America’s title relied on “the Law of Nations . . . that 
priority of discovery, followed in a reasonable time by actual occupation, confers 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty.”248   
In New Zealand, the British were somewhat worried about the intentions of the 
French, especially on the east coast of the South Island at Akaroa.  The presence of the 
French motivated Captain Hobson in May 1840 to claim sovereignty of the South Island 
on the basis of Discovery rather than by treaty cession.249  This angered some of the 
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French, including Captain Langlois who continued to insist” “The ownership and 
sovereignty of France over the South Island of New Zealand cannot be disputed.  I have 
myself made treaties both for the land and the cession of sovereignty.”250  Nonetheless, 
France tacitly acknowledged British sovereignty of New Zealand in 1840.251 
 
C.  Preemption/European title 
 
English and European colonists often claimed that they had gained the complete 
fee title to the lands of Indigenous peoples under first discovery.252  Yet they rarely 
meant that phrase in the literal sense, to mean the “fee simple absolute” title.  All 
European colonists and countries realized that they had to buy the remaining legal righ
of the Native people in America.  What Europeans meant by claiming the “fee title”
actually that they had acquired the power of preemption, the sole right to buy the lands 
from the Indigenous people.  But since Indigenous people were destined for extinction or 
assimilation, the European title of preemption only had to await that eventual destiny to 
morph into a complete fee title.
ts 
 was 
                                                          
253   
The English Crown and colonists used the power of preemption over American 
Indians from the beginning of their settlements in North America.  All of the colonies 
enacted numerous laws to regulate the purchase and leasing of Indian lands because the 
colonies alleged they held the preemptive authority.254  In 1763, however, George III 
attempted to reassert his preeminence in exercising the preemption power over Indian 
land purchases in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.255 
The American states and the United States also assumed the power of preemption 
over American Indians from their very beginning.  The states drafted laws and 
constitutions in which they expressly claimed and exercised preemption.256  The Articles 
Congress in 1783 and the new United States government in 1790 also took absolute 
250 T. LINDSAY BUICK, THE FRENCH AT AKAROA: AN ADVENTURE IN COLONIZATION 276 (1928). 
 
251 See id. 
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control over Indian land sales through preemption clauses in their governing documents, 
statutes, and treaties.257 
In 1792, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson twice illustrated perfectly the 
definition of this element.  First, he explained America’s preemption right: “our States, 
are inhabited by Indians holding justly the right of occupation, and leaving . . . to us only 
the claim of excluding other nations from among them, and of becoming ourselves the 
purchasers of such portions of land, from time to time, as they may choose to sell.”258  
Second, he explained the American preemption right over England and the Indian 
Nations to the English ambassador.  He said that the United States had a  
 
right to preemption of their [Indian] lands; that is to say, the sole and exclusive 
right of purchasing from them whenever they should be willing to sell. . . .  Did I 
suppose that the right of preemption prohibited any individual of another nation 
from purchasing lands which the Indians should be willing to sell?  Certainly.  We 
consider it as established by the usage of different nations into a kind of Jus 
gentium [international law] for America, that a white nation settling down and 
declaring that such and such are their limits, makes an invasion of those limits by 
any other white nation an act of war, but gives no right of soil against the native 
possessors.259   
 
In New Zealand, the English expressly claimed this exact Discovery right.  In 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi, the British Crown negotiated for the right of 
preemption and the Maori expressly ceded this right to the Crown.260  In 1847, in the 
Symonds case, Judge Chapman reinforced the Queen’s pre-emptive right in law, 
recognizing that the Queen acquired this right independent of the Treaty of Waitangi.261  
The right of preemption was regarded as integral to the assertion of sovereignty.  In the 
1860s, the Crown waived its right of preemption in favor of establishing a court system 
empowered to regulate sales between Maori and settlers.262  A new land status, Maori 
freehold land, was established.  However, in regard to land that the Crown wanted to own 
but Maori wished to retain, the common law developed to assert that the colonizing 
power acquired a radical title or underlying title that was subject to existing Maori rights 
in the land.263  While those rights are not supposed to be extinguished in times of peace 
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otherwise than by the free consent of the Maori occupiers, if deemed necessary the 
Crown can take such drastic action in specific circumstances to compulsorily acquire the 
land but must pay proper compensation.  A modern day example of a breach of this 
common law rule was the enactment of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004.  There the 
Government purported ownership of the foreshore and seabed in return for almost no 
compensation. 264  The Government was able to do this because in New Zealand the 
Government is supreme.265 
 
D.  Indian/Native title 
 
Under European and American claims to preemption and title it is no wonder that 
Indigenous people were considered by Euro-American legal systems to have lost the full 
ownership of their lands.  They were considered to have only retained the right to occupy 
and use their lands.  That is still a valuable property right which could have lasted forever 
if Natives never consented to sell, were forced off, or died out.  But under their restricted 
title, Natives could only sell to the government that held the power of preemption.   
The English Crown and colonists used this principle against American Indians 
from the beginning.  The Crown granted legal estates in lands in North America while 
almost totally ignoring Indian ownership.266  In the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
however, George III demonstrated a more correct understanding of the restricted Indian 
title and that he would have to buy the remaining Indian property rights before he could 
acquire possession and use rights.267  The colonial governments also understood this 
principle.  They all enacted numerous statutes that demonstrated the restricted Indian title 
and in which they authorized and ratified sales of Indian lands.268  Under Euro-American 
legal thinking and Discovery, Native peoples and their governments did not possess the 
right to sell their lands without the permission of the colonial governments.    
Thereafter, the new American state governments immediately imposed these same 
restrictions on the Indian Nations.269  The federal government also applied the idea of 
Indian title and restricted tribal real property rights.270  In 1810, the U.S. Supreme Court 
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defined some aspects of the limited rights possessed by the Indian Nations when it held 
that the states could transfer their future titles in Indian lands even while the Tribes still 
possessed the lands.271  In 1955, when the Court was faced with the question of Native 
land ownership in Alaska, it stated that the Tribe in question held only a limited right of 
occupancy: “after the coming of the white man [the tribe held] what is sometimes termed 
original Indian title or permission from the whites to occupy.”272  Indian or Native title is 
obviously a limited form of real property ownership far short of the fee simple title. 
By comparison, in New Zealand, a unique land title system was established.  
While the Treaty of Waitangi, in the English version, guaranteed to Maori the ‘full 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and 
other properties,’273 or as in the Maori version, continuing sovereignty over their 
property,274 in reality the British Crown severely limited the property rights in Maori 
land.  For the first twenty years post the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori could 
only sell, lease or gift their land to the Crown in accordance with the right of preemption 
agreed to in the Treaty of Waitangi.275  In the 1860s, the colonial Government waived its 
right of preemption in favor of Maori being able to freely alienate their land (similar to 
the opening of lands for colonial settlement in the United States pursuant to the Allotment 
Act of 1887.)  The catch being, Maori first had to obtain a certificate of title from the 
newly established Maori Land Court to prove that they owned the land.276  Once they had 
a certificate of title, they could sell, lease or gift their land to whoever they wished.  The 
system sought to transform land communally held by Maori families into individualized 
titles derived from the Crown.  The early legislation was premised on encouraging as 
much alienation of Maori land as possible.  By the 1930s, most Maori land in New 
Zealand had gone through the Maori Land Court system and had been sold to non-
Maori.277  Today, only a smidgen of Maori freehold land remains, and the legislative 
intent since 1993 encourages the retention and development of that land by its Maori 
owners.  Thus, today Maori freehold land is heavily legislated depicting stringent 
alienation rules.278  Nearly all transactions involving Maori freehold land now need to be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1973) (act to remove eastern tribes west of the Mississippi, Congress expressly 
required that the “Indian title” to the western lands had to be extinguished before moving Indians there).      
 
271 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138-39, 142-43 (1810) ("[T]he nature of the Indian title . . . is 
not such as to be absolutely repugnant to [seisin] in fee on the part of the state."); accord Meigs v. 
McClung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11, 17-18 (1815).  See also Meriwether L. Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. 
(13 Pet.) 195, 201 (1839).   
 
272 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955). 
 
273 Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 122.  
 
274 Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 122. 
 
275 Supra note 141 and accompanying text.  
 
276 See Native Lands Act 1862 and Native Lands Act 1865.  See supra note 172. 
 
277 See, e.g., supra note 176. 
 
278 See Maori Land Act 1993/Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
 48
confirmed by the Maori Land Court, making it timely and costly to even contemplate sale 
or lease. 
Thus, “Indian title” or “native title” in the United States, and ‘Maori freehold in 
New Zealand was, and is still considered today, a limited ownership right. 
 
E.  Tribal limited sovereign and commercial rights 
 
The inherent sovereign powers of Indigenous Nations and the rights of Indigenous 
people to free trade and diplomatic international relations were also limited by Discovery.  
After a first discovery by Euro-Americans, Indigenous Nations were only supposed to 
deal with the European or American government that had discovered them. 
The Crown exerted this alleged authority in the charters it issued when it 
established governmental authority, jurisdiction, courts, and trade protocols in North 
America.279  All the colonies enacted numerous laws exercising exclusive control of the 
trade with Indians and tribes.280  The English colonies, in fact, objected to Dutch 
colonists trading with America Indians, and Dutch colonies in turn objected to Swedish 
colonists trading with Indians, all based on this element of Discovery.281  
The American states attempted to control Indian sovereign and commercial 
powers.282  The federal government also tried to take complete control of these activities 
because the Constitution granted it sole authority to engage in treaty making and 
commercial relations with the Indian Nations.283  Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson 
again demonstrated the correct understanding of this element in his 1792 conversation 
with the British ambassador.  Jefferson explained the power the United States held over 
the Indian Nations: “A right of regulating the commerce between them and the whites.  
[Hammond asked do the English traders have to stay out? Jefferson said Yes].”284 
President George Washington utilized this element.  In 1795, at his urging, 
Congress created federal trading houses to totally control the Indian trade.  Government 
trading houses were ultimately operated at twenty-eight locations all across the frontier 
from 1795-1822.285  Furthermore, in hundreds of treaties the federal government and 
tribes agreed that the United States would control the Indian trade and protect tribes in 
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many ways.286  The Supreme Court came to interpret these provisions as creating a trust 
responsibility that requires the federal government to care for tribes in a ward/guardian 
relationship and that defines Indian Tribes as “domestic dependent nations.”287 
More starkly, in New Zealand, post the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, the 
colonial Government recognized no sovereign power held by Maori.  It was not accepted 
that Maori retained any sovereignty, government or commercial rights.  Maori were 
simply to become British subjects as articulated in article 3 of the Treaty: “In 
consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New 
Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British 
Subjects.”  This approach meant that, in contrast to policies advanced in North America, 
in New Zealand there were no consistent efforts made to geographically isolate Maori by 
drawing lines to denote reserves.  Maori were simply regarded as ‘noble savages’ who 
could be hastily christianized and assimilated, thus leading to the demise of the separate 
Maori race.    
 
F.  Contiguity   
 
This element granted Euro-Americans a Discovery and preemption claim over 
very large areas contiguous to their actual settlements in the New World.  Furthermore, 
contiguity held that the discovery of the mouth of a river created a claim over the entire 
drainage system of the river.  The shapes of the Louisiana Territory, the western drainage 
system of the Mississippi River, and the Oregon Country, the drainage system of the 
Columbia River, demonstrate the scope of this aspect of Discovery. 
The English Crown and its colonial governments in North America used this 
Discovery element against other European and Indigenous governments.  The royal 
charters claimed to grant property rights over vast areas of land, including islands and 
ocean surrounding colonial settlements.288  The charters granted rights as far as the head 
waters of many rivers and the contiguous lands.289  Thereafter, the colonies claimed their 
borders to the furthest degree possible based on contiguity.  For example, the English 
colonies objected to Dutch colonies being established in America because they were 
within areas the English claimed based on contiguity.290 
Later, American states relied on this element when they cited the charters as 
setting their western borders at the Pacific Ocean.291  On the federal side, Thomas 
Jefferson demonstrated the use of contiguity in his research to determine the size of the 
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Louisiana Territory.  He relied on the drainage system of the Mississippi River and tried 
to determine the course and location of the tributaries of that river.  Jefferson even hinted 
in his research that Louisiana gave the United States a claim as far as the Pacific.292  
Notwithstanding his thoughts on this topic, there is no question that a House Committee 
claimed in 1804 that the Louisiana Territory stretched to the Pacific due to contiguity.293 
Other American politicians also used contiguity to claim the Oregon Country.  In 
1819, Senator Thomas Hart Benton claimed American ownership due to “[c]ontiguity & 
continuity of settlement & possession.”294  By the mid-1840s, President Polk and most 
Americans defined the Oregon Country as being the entire drainage system of the 
Columbia River, reaching far into present day British Columbia.295  And American 
diplomats argued to England that the U.S. owned the entire Oregon Country “on the 
ground of contiguity.”296   
By comparison, in New Zealand, the colonial Government sought ownership of 
land via purchase from Maori or legislation permitting wide-scale confiscation.  
However, in regard to lakes and rivers, the owners of land abutting these waters, for 
example, used the common law to justify exclusive rights to the lake’s fisheries.297 
 
G.  Terra nullius   
 
Discovery also defined lands that were not possessed or occupied by any person 
or nation, or were not being used in a fashion that European legal systems approved, as 
being “vacant” and available for first discovery claims.   
The English Crown and colonists used terra nullius to claim the lands of 
American Indians.  Thus, the Crown claimed the authority to grant rights in the “deserts” 
and the “deserted” and “waste and desolate” and “uncultivated” lands in America because 
they were only “partly occupied by Savages.”298  The colonists also relied on terra 
nullius because they thought, for example, that New Jersey was “an uninhabited country 
found out by British subjects.”299  A 1765 history of New Jersey agreed and stated that 
English claims to New Jersey were based on first discovery, possession, and “the well 
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known Jus Gentium, LAW OF NATIONS, that whatever waste or uncultivated country is 
discovered, it is the right of that prince who had been at the charge of the discovery.”300      
The United States used this element when arguing to England that the Pacific 
Northwest was a “vacant territory.”301  The U.S. Supreme Court also relied on terra 
nullius in discussing Discovery.302  Finally, in 1895, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge even 
placed the idea of terra nullius into the 1895 Republican Party platform.  The platform 
called for America to expand into “all the waste places of the earth” and noted that Cuba 
was only “sparsely settled.”303 
In contrast, the history of terra nullius in New Zealand has not been so clear-cut.  
New Zealand’s Court of Appeal, in 2003, stated that “New Zealand was never thought to 
be terra nullius.”304  However, the reasoning in Wi Parata, the 1877 case, is rife with 
terra nullius discourse.305  For example, the Court asserted that Maori had no form of 
civil government or any settled system of law, possessed few political relations to each 
other, and were “incompetent to act, or even to deliberate, in concert.”  In describing the 
Maori tribes as “petty” and as “incapable of performing the duties, and therefore of 
assuming the rights, of a civilized community,” the Court essentially declared the country 
terra nullius.  Moreover, the Crown’s assumption of ownership of the foreshore and 
seabed in 2004 is perhaps an example of a revived terra nullius claim.306  There the 
Government passed legislation claiming ownership of land under salt water without due 
regard to compensation for Maori because it believed the foreshore and seabed occupies a 
‘special juridical space’.  Paul McHugh advanced this reasoning in the Waitangi 
Tribunal.  For example, he asserted: 
 
At common law, the Crown’s sovereignty over the foreshore and seabed 
amounts to a ‘bundle of rights’ less than full ownership; therefore, the 
common law doctrine of aboriginal title, which has effect because of and at 
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the moment of acquisition of sovereignty, cannot recognize customary rights 
that are greater than those of the sovereign.307 
 
The Tribunal accepted this reasoning:  “the law cannot recognize for Indigenous 
people what it does not recognize for the sovereign power.  It is a variant of the 
legal maxim: you cannot give what you do not have”.308  In other words, the 
foreshore and seabed became terra nullius, only capable of Crown ownership. 
 
H.  Christianity 
 
The religion of Europeans, English colonists, and American citizens was a 
significant aspect of Discovery.  Under the Doctrine, non-Christian people did not have 
the same rights to land, property, sovereignty, and self-determination as Christians. 
The English Crown and colonists in North America overtly used this element 
against American Indians.  The Crown called on the Christian God’s assistance and 
authority to colonize America, to claim Indian lands, and to expand the Christian flock by 
conversions.309  The colonies relied heavily on this element to justify their attempts to 
control Native people.310  
The American states and the United States also used religion to justify dominating 
Indian Nations and trying to assimilate Indians into American society.  The federal 
government, for example, turned over the operation of many reservations and the 
education of Indian children to Christian denominations, and even granted tribal lands to 
churches.311  In contrast, Indian religious beliefs and ceremonies were officially 
ridiculed, suppressed, and outlawed for over one hundred 312 years.  
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Similarly, in New Zealand, a significant component of colonization involved the 
mandate to Christianize Maori, including the banning of Maori religious beliefs and 
ceremonies.313  
 
I.  Civilization 
 
The assumed superiority of Euro-American cultures and civilizations was an 
important part of Discovery.  Euro-Americans thought that God had directed them to 
bring civilized ways and education to Indigenous peoples and to exercise paternalism and 
guardianship powers over them.  
From the beginning of North American explorations, the Crown and colonists 
justified the domination of American Indians and English legal rights on the assumption 
that they possessed the superior civilization and that Indians were savage barbarians.314  
The American states and the United States also actively applied this Discovery element 
against American Indians.  These governments attempted to destroy and remake Indian 
people and their cultures, legal systems, and governments into Euro-American clones.315  
As one example, in 1895, the Republican Party platform stated the goal to expand 
America into “all the waste places of the earth” because that would be a great gain “for 
civilization and the advancement of the race.”316     
In New Zealand, this idea of civilization was inherent in many of the colonial 
actions.  For instance, by the 1860s the colonial Government had began to legislate 
against the use of Maori language, customs and laws.317  The Maori Land Court was 
established with the express purpose to advance and civilize the Natives.318  The Court in 
the Wi Parata case justified not recognizing the Treaty of Waitangi or the doctrine of 
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native title because Maori were ‘barbarians’ and ‘uncivilised.’319  Today, this reasoning 
is no longer accepted as precedent.  In 2003, the Court of Appeal overruled Wi Parata.320
No contemporary case law refers to Maori as uncivilized.  Instead, the country is 
grappling with what it means if the Government now accepts that all land in New 
Zealand was once owned by Maori.  A comprehensive settlement process is taking place 
in New Zealand whereby the Crown is seeking to address and compensate for historical 
breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi.
  
                                                          
321 
 
J.  Conquest 
  
 This element asserts that Native lands and legal titles could be taken by military 
actions.  The word was also used as a term of art to describe the rights Europeans gained 
automatically over Indigenous Nations by making a first discovery.   
 We see the implied use of this element when the Crown granted legal estates in 
Indian lands in America through the charters.  English officials expressly used this 
element, for example, in 1751, when they claimed that Indian Tribes had lost the 
ownership of their lands due to supporting the French in a losing war.322  The colony of 
Connecticut made a similar claim for over a century that it had acquired title to Indian 
lands due to its victory in the Pequot War of 1637.323 
 The United States Articles of Confederation Congress also tried to utilize this 
element in 1783-84 when federal officials argued to tribes that they had lost their lands 
due to fighting for the British in the Revolutionary War.324  This same Congress then 
expressly placed the element of conquest in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 when it 
stated that a “just” war can take Indian title.325  In 1848, the United States Congress then 
applied the Northwest Ordinance and the Discovery element of conquest to the Oregon 
Country.326  The United States Supreme Court, of course, defined this element in 1823, 
and the federal courts have relied on it as part of Discovery ever since.327 
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Similarly, in New Zealand, particularly in the 1860s and 1870s, the British 
unleashed war on North Island Maori to take land.  Legislation was passed to legitimate 
the taking of Maori land even in instances of British military defeats.328 
In sum, it is striking but not at all surprising how similar the use of the elements 
of Discovery is in the histories of New Zealand and the United States.  The comparative 
framework that we analyze above illustrates graphically just how deeply rooted the legal 
fictions of Discovery are in our legal systems.  The Doctrine always has been, since 
European settlement, and still is today part of the property law regimes of both our 
countries.329  While there are slight variations, the differences mostly arise from the 
different social and cultural contexts of Maori people and American Indians.  For 
instance, even though there is a Treaty of Waitangi, Maori Land Court, and Waitangi 
Tribunal in New Zealand, the underlying tenor that the Parliament relies on to legitimate 
itself is the dialogue of covert Discovery, most recently evidenced in the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004.  Equally, notwithstanding hundreds of treaty promises by the United 
States to protect American Indian tribal property and Indian rights, and the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence statement that all men are created equal, American history 
demonstrates the exact opposite treatment of American Indian governments, Indian 
people, and their property rights by the United States.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Historically, comparative law, as a Western legal theory, has mostly produced a 
spectrum of research results for Indigenous peoples ranging from worthless to 
destructive.  Comparative law has its history in a colonial binary of ethnocentricity, 
meaning that comparisons have often taken place by evaluating other races and cultures 
by criteria specific to one’s own.  Lawyers, legal academics, judges, and legislatures, 
have historically gazed at Indigenous Peoples not through lenses of wanting to 
understand the differences, but to eliminate differences.  This Article is rife with these 
examples.  In both countries, the European colonists pursued a mission to destroy the 
cultures, laws, and governments of Indigenous peoples.  A campaign to ‘civilize’ these 
‘others’ by making illegal the practicing of all their ways of knowing was sought through 
the means of law.  While no comparative legal theorist would today desire “a larking 
adventure in prospecting” among “primitive” cultures,330 and no judiciary or legislature 
would overtly aspire to destroy Indigenous laws and practices, it is perhaps debatable 
whether the modern comparative law paradigm can provide a legitimate starting point to 
conduct worthwhile research for Indigenous peoples.  We think, however, that it can.   
Despite reserving some concerns, we believe that Western comparative legal 
theory should be embraced by Indigenous scholars.  As some have already asserted, it is 
important for Indigenous researchers to engage with Western theory to expose its 
ethnocentricity and decolonize it in order to make a better postcolonial world.  
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Indigenous peoples have practiced their own versions of comparative law for centuries: 
the sharing of knowledge and the adaptation of legal traditions through spending time 
with other tribal groups.  Henderson emphasizes the importance for contemporary 
Indigenous scholarship to “dialogue comparatively.”331  He explains: “This methodology 
not only allows others to learn from the Indigenous experience, but also offers greater 
legitimacy for Indigenous peoples.  The relevance of the ‘Indigenous Humanities’ to the 
postcolonial consciousness and law can provide teachings and lessons learned by 
Indigenous peoples around the world.”332  John Borrows has recognized: “Our 
intellectual, emotional, social, physical, and spiritual insights can simultaneously be 
compared, contrasted, rejected, embraced, and intermingled with those of others.  In fact, 
this process has been operative since before the time that Indigenous peoples first 
encountered others on their shores.”333  It is in this vein of respectfully coming together 
to share our experiences of the Doctrine of Discovery and our hope for a better future that 
has motivated us to write within a comparative framework.  
 Comparative law methodology is not, and should not be, solely a Western 
theoretical undertaking.  Many comparativists, in fact, realize that the primary focus of 
comparative law on just the United States and Europe has been a problem.334  But even 
worse, perhaps, is the ethnocentric failure to even consider Indigenous legal systems.  For 
example, in 1941, one of the pioneering American comparativists, John Wigmore, 
surveyed 16 principal legal systems: Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Hebrew, Chinese, Hindu, 
Greek, Roman, Japanese, Mohammedan, Keltic, Slavic, Germanic, maritime, papal, 
Romanesque, and Anglican.335  Absent from this list was an Indigenous legal system.  
Mostly absent, still today, are comparative studies of Indigenous legal systems.  There 
remains little solid interest in undertaking legal comparative work that concerns British 
colonized Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia or New Zealand.  
Most contemporary comparative work in the United States is concentrated in exploring 
the similarities and differences with legal systems in Europe, Asia and Latin America.336  
If the gaze turns to Indigenous peoples at all, it is most likely to be in Africa.337  
Moreover, even though some excellent work has been done by academics interested in 
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better understanding the prevalence of colonization for Indigenous peoples in the United 
States and New Zealand, few have situated their work squarely within a theoretical 
comparative framework.   
Some recent legal texts have sought to better understand the encounter between 
the common law legal system and the Indigenous peoples of North America and 
Australia, including the work by Paul McHugh and Stuart Banner although they do so 
from within a legal-historian lens and not specifically using comparative law theory.338  
Others have also completed impressive work including the recent publications by Paul 
Keal,339 Peter Russell,340 and Christa Scholtz,341 but these authors write from non-law 
perspectives, such as political science.  The one legal academic who is explicitly situating 
his work on Indigenous legal systems, and within a comparative methodology, is 
Canadian law professor H. Patrick Glenn.  His book includes a chapter on Indigenous 
peoples – classified by Glenn as “chthonic peoples.”342  However, the motivation for us 
to pursue comparative legal work is not to describe who we are or the legal system dear 
to our hearts, but rather to examine how the Western legal system has developed and 
applied a property theory based in fiction to substantiate the continuing colonization of 
Indigenous peoples’ land and resources.343  We believe, as Indigenous legal academics, 
that a comparative legal framework has much to offer the movement of decolonization 
and in doing so we aspire to make a contribution to an improved application of 
comparative legal theory.  This Article represents some initial thoughts within the context 
of comparative law and the Doctrine of Discovery.  
The discipline of comparative law is burgeoning.  In recent years several seminal 
texts have been published focused on exploring the theory of comparative law.  This 
work provides a particularly helpful paradigm in which to explore Discovery.  As von 
Nessen has stated: “Comparative law accepts the important relationship between law, 
history and culture, and operates on the basis that each legal system is a unique mixture 
of the spirit of its people and is the product of a complex matrix of historical events 
which have produced a ‘distinctive national character and ambience’.”344  Thus, 
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comparative law might provide the perfect avenue to portray the enveloping character of 
a cultural and historical development of the Doctrine of Discovery discourse.   
We have taken this advice to heart and have focused on the legal history of our 
two countries and the Doctrine of Discovery.  The comparative law framework we set out 
above illustrates the pervasiveness of the Doctrine on an international scale and more 
relevantly in our countries.  Moreover, Discovery is not just an esoteric and interesting 
relic of our histories.  It continues to impact Indigenous peoples today in the United 
States and New Zealand, and in many other countries around the world.  For example, the 
Doctrine continues to play a very significant role in American Indian law and policies 
because it still restricts Indian people and Indian Nations in their property, governmental, 
and self-determination rights.345  This is true for Maori too.346  The cultural, racial, and 
religious justifications that led to the development of Discovery raise serious doubts 
about the validity of New Zealand and the United States continuing to apply the Doctrine 
in modern day American Indian and Maori affairs.   
It is not surprising that the legal histories of the United States and New Zealand in 
regards their Native peoples are so similar.  This is a natural result of basing their conduct 
towards, and their claims against, the Indigenous people on the Doctrine of Discovery.  In 
fact, we are surprised to find any differences at all between the applications of Discovery 
in our countries.  The numerous similarities are not surprising because both of our 
countries share a very similar colonization discourse.  If one understands the international 
law Doctrine of Discovery and its elements, it makes perfect sense how and why the 
English colonists in New Zealand and the United States and then our national 
governments applied the same international legal principles against Native peoples in the 
ways that they did.   
 Apparently, Europeans, and then New Zealanders and Americans, possessed the 
only valid religions, civilizations, governments, laws, and cultures, and Providence 
intended these people and their institutions to dominate Indigenous people in their 
countries.  As a result, the human, governmental, and property rights of Indigenous 
peoples were almost totally disregarded as Discovery directed European colonial 
expansion in our countries.  It remains a dangerous legal fiction still in use in modern 
times. 
In focusing on the Doctrine of Discovery, this Article has reinforced what we 
already know: “legal systems develop in close contact to others: new ideas may evolve 
within one line of tradition and then spread quickly, with great effect on other legal 
systems.”347  The similarities are rife between the United States and a country on the 
other side of the world, New Zealand, in their treatment of their Indigenous peoples and 
their definitions of the legal rights of their Native citizens.  The common understanding is 
potent and illustrates the complexity that will be involved in any efforts to decolonize the 
legal systems in both countries. 
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